A confusing tactical trend has become increasingly widespread in the opening week of the 2026 World Cup.

When teams kick off, rather than play it backwards and keep possession, they instead boot the ball out for a throw-in deep in their opponents’ territory.

Even France, one of the favourites to win the World Cup and clearly good enough to build an attack from deep, started their Group I opener against Senegal by launching the ball out for a throw, immediately conceding possession.

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Explaining the confusing kick-offs at the 2026 World Cup

Casual fans would be forgiven for briefly thinking they have switched on a game of rugby union, where kicking the ball out of play to gain territory is a common tactic.

But the practice has crept into top-level football and is not as baffling as it may appear.

In a similar way to rugby, the aim of launching the ball out for a throw deep in your opponents’ half is to force them to play it out from a dangerous position, putting them under pressure from the first whistle.

Of course, the opposition may also decide to whack the ball up the pitch to prevent themselves being penned in, but that results in the side that took the kick-off regaining possession anyway.

Equally, if they choose another safety-first tactic by throwing the ball up the line, there is a good chance they will be unable to play out of a tight space and it will come straight back where it came from.

The tactic will be familiar to North American audiences, who saw Champions League holders Paris Saint-Germain regularly kick the ball out of play from kick-off during their run to last summer's Club World Cup final in the United States.

It then became more widespread in the Premier League in a season where managers favoured no-risk football more than at any time in recent years.

Indeed, several English top-flight teams including eventual champions Arsenal, as well as Brentford and Bournemouth, even put their own slant on the tactic. The player taking the kick-off would touch the ball to a team-mate a couple of yards behind, who would then chip it up and volley it high into the air.

That would create an aerial duel between the defensive side and the onrushing attackers, who would hope to profit from any botched clearances.

With everyone from France to Qatar trying the tactic at the World Cup, it appears these kick-offs are here to stay.

Conor Gallagher appears destined for the Tottenham Hotspur Stadium this month with a fee reportedly agreed between Spurs and Spanish giants Atletico.

Gallagher has spent the past 18 months in Spain's capital working under respected Atleti boss Diego Simeone but is now set for a return to London with Thomas Frank's Spurs.

Tottenham find themselves in the bottom half of the Premier League table and out of both domestic cups, although the team are expected to progress to the knockout rounds of this season's Champions League.

Conor Gallagher signing doesn't solve Spurs' biggest problem

Frank's tenure has not gone to plan thus far, with the team struggling to fashion chances, in particular. Spurs have also punched above their weight in terms of goals scored versus Expected Goals (xG), which is widely regarded as an unsustainable practice.

The North Londoners have recorded the fourth-lowest xG tally in the Premier League this season, but have managed to score 30 goals. Their overperformance is partly down to strong finishing but this cannot be relied upon to continue throughout the second half of 2025/26.

Therefore, the signing of Gallagher has drawn criticism from some corners of the club's support, that they are signing a player deemed too similar to current midfield starter Joao Palhinha.

That is not strictly the case and Rodrigo Bentancur's three-month injury lay-off has necessitated the anticipated Gallagher purchase. The ex-Chelsea midfielder is more box-to-box than his Portuguese counterpart and has scored seven goals in 77 appearances for Atletico, but there certainly are similarities to their respective styles.

Whilst Palhinha is regarded as more combative, Gallagher can be trusted to transport the ball upfield more frequently and with greater success. Neither player is particularly effective at progressing the ball with their passing ability, though, which could be cause for concern for Frank.

Similarly, Palhinha and Gallagher are not prolific chance creators, which is hardly likely to help address their xG overperformance.

Alternatives in the middle of the park Lucas Bergvall, Pape Matar Sarr and Archie Gray are all lacking somewhat in the progressive passing department, placing in the 20th, 14th and 2nd percentile, respectively.

Gallagher is an improvement, ranking in the 31st percentile, however, it is still evidently not a strength of his.

Granted, Spurs' ball progression tends to come from the flanks with Pedro Porro and Djed Spence scoring favourably compared to their midfield teammates, but nullify these avenues and opponents will know that Spurs' ball progression through the middle relies on ball-carrying as opposed to line-breaking passes. Once an opposition manager realises this, it is easier to formulate a plan to stop it.

In FourFourTwo's opinion, the Gallagher signing mitigates for Bentancur's injury which can be seen as a positive, but the squad does need a different profile in the centre of midfield, which the 25-year-old arrival from Atletico isn't entirely.

Football isn’t as predictable as some would like to think.

Just like Arne Slot’s first season in England wasn’t supposed to be so easy, replacing Jurgen Klopp at Liverpool and winning the Premier League at a canter, the Dutchman’s second season wasn’t supposed to have unravelled in the way it has by early November.

After a record spend, including two club record signings over £100 million, Slot’s side were favourites to win back-to-back league titles, something the Reds haven’t achieved since 1984.

But after five defeats in six league games, the likelihood of retaining the title is looking increasingly slim.

It’s not just the defeats, though, it’s the performances, the lack of any issues seemingly being addressed, an admittance from Slot that his side can’t cope against teams who play long balls, and poor form that actually goes back to March.

Indeed, since exiting the Champions League at the hands of PSG and losing the Carabao Cup final against Newcastle five days later, Liverpool have won just 11 of their 26 matches in all competitions.

The deeper statistics are alarming, to say the least. In six of the last seven league games their opponents have out-run Liverpool. In the league defeat at Crystal Palace, Slot’s side covered 5km fewer than their opponents, but spent almost 5kms more walking.

Defensively, Liverpool are leaking goals at a relegation rate. Since the beginning of May, they’ve conceded 36 goals, which only Wolves, of all teams in the top five European leagues, have conceded more.

And there is little sign of progress. Consistently, Liverpool are being out-run, losing duels, and - especially in the last outing at Manchester City - outmanoeuvred. Against City, Liverpool’s entire midfield, including subs, and their centre-backs made no tackles. In a match they lost 3-0 to a supposed title rival. Passive doesn’t even begin to describe it.

The reasons for this can be debated, and plenty in the media have had their say. There is, of course, the tragedy that the players have suffered following the loss of Diogo Jota.

Most, too, have pointed to the upheaval within the squad in terms of players incoming and outgoing. And while the departures of Luis Diaz and Trent Alexander-Arnold were player-led, Liverpool are certainly missing those two who were key components of the team that won the title.

For many, Slot has sought to change too much at once. Not content with the huge turnover in the playing squad, the Dutchman has changed tactics, citing a need to change due to teams playing differently against his side in the second half of last season compared to the first.

Who decides on Liverpool's recruitment these days?

But, perhaps, the biggest question is whether all the change was Slot’s desire, or was led by Liverpool’s recruitment team.

When Slot was first unveiled, in a rather low-key and belated press conference seven weeks after his announcement as the club’s new head coach, he was seated alongside the new sporting director, Richard Hughes.

It was somewhat surprising and quite refreshing to hear from Hughes, who had joined from Bournemouth. “I’d say a quiet July and crescendo in August would probably be the way to sum it up,” predicted Hughes.

Liverpool’s summer actually was remarkably quiet throughout, with few outgoings and only Federico Chiesa arriving. Such stability was needed after the off-pitch departures of Klopp, his coaching staff and a host of other backroom figures.

The contrast with the past summer could not be starker. Again, there were departures in the coaching staff, with the goalkeeper department completely changed again, while Diaz, Alexander-Arnold, Darwin Nunez and Jarell Quansah left from the title-winning squad.

They were replaced handsomely, but not necessarily like-for-like. There has been no real replacement for Diaz and the attributes he provided from the left. Alexander-Arnold’s replacement, of sorts, in Jeremie Frimpong could not be more different.

In spending over £200 million on Hugo Ekitike and Alexander Isak, the question becomes what is the actual plan?

Slot has, of course, pointed to the options that having two No.9s of such quality provides, but it seems highly unlikely that remaining with the 4-2-3-1 system can get the best out of each of those, plus Mohamed Salah and Florian Wirtz.

Liverpool signed a lot of very, very good footballers. But quite what the plan is to get them all on the pitch at the same time appears a mystery, let alone to have them form a cohesive unit that works in the Premier League.

Many have pointed at a potential change to a back three and moving to a system more akin to the one which saw Wirtz thrive as one of the dual No.10s at Leverkusen - a system that would at least seemingly get the best out of full-backs Frimpong and Milos Kerkez.

But even then, that would still mean both Isak and Ekitike cannot be accommodated, let alone Salah’s role and whether Dominik Szoboszlai - by far the most important player this season - takes up a deeper role, thus losing his pressing ability higher up the pitch.

The summer spending seems more aimed at a world post-Salah, once the Egyptian has departed the club, allowing for a move to, perhaps, two up front with Wirtz as the playmaking No.10.

But with Salah still here and earning a reported £400,000 per week, it’s a conundrum that few can provide a solid answer to, even on paper, and something that is proving impossible for Slot to solve.

The Dutchman has frequently expressed his admiration for how PSG played last season, and the signings in the summer appear to reflect that and be aimed towards breaking down teams who defend deep (in a low block), plus replacing Alexander-Arnold’s creative output. But with the Premier League becoming more physical and direct, it seems like the team and squad are built for one style of play, and it’s a style of play that doesn’t suit the main competition they play in.

It also seems quite idealistic, but not as good in practice.

What doesn’t help is that Slot is left to answer questions on recruitment and the strategy. Hughes hasn’t given an interview since that opening press conference, but in a rare speech at a Summit in September, the sporting director explained of the transfer fees paid: “In the fullness of time, we hope that, instead of talking now about what a huge fee it is, it has been value for money for the football club whenever we’re making that assessment in the future.

“And because of the ages of the players that we’ve bought, we’re confident that will end up being the case.”

But time isn’t something that football managers are afforded too often in the modern game, which Hughes also acknowledges: “We also want to try and win now, and that’s important as well, so I’m not describing them as works in progress or anything like that.”

Winning now is something Slot must find a way to get back to, and fast.

This season, Arsenal have been accused of being boring, of having little more to offer beyond set-piece brilliance and of lacking much of an edge in open play.

Their victory at the weekend did little to sway the naysayers, either: Arsenal netted their first via a corner, and with Burnley looking resolute, a 2-0 scoreline hardly lifted anyone off their seats.

Yet beneath the exterior of another Declan Rice masterclass, the first half performance in particular highlighted why Mikel Arteta's side may well have overcome their final hurdle in becoming the complete team capable of competing against any side.

Arsenal have made a tactical tweak with their build-up that is reaping rewards in attack

Arteta is often criticised for playing two centre-backs at full-back, in Jurrien Timber and Riccardo Calafiori. Of course, they don't actually function as centre-backs: though both have played there for their respective countries, the pair have license to roam in the final third and contribute massively to Arsenal's attack.

By fielding full-backs who are capable of playing centre-back, though, the Gunners not only have a defensive base strong enough to platform their attack, they have two players who can build up in a back three. Arsenal play out in a kind of 3-2-2-3 formation – and both Timber and Calafiori are equally adept at receiving and playing forward in this first line.

As noted last year in Arsenal's 2-0 home win over Paris Saint-Germain in the Champions League, however, Arteta wants a teams of ‘generalists’: like Pep Guardiola, he wants as many players capable of playing in differing roles, so that whatever formation or system he's playing, his players can adapt.

This doesn't just mean that he likes versatile players. Take Calafiori, for example: he can play as a defensive full-back man-marking his winger, he can invert into midfield, he can pop up as a no.10, or he can overlap his left-winger: in all of these roles, he's still a left-back… he's just playing different kinds of left-backs.

Arteta wants his players to interchange positionally during games, with build-up a particular area of fluidity – and this season, Martin Zubimendi has even dropped into the first line of build-up to assist Saliba and Gabriel.

By doing this, the Basque no.6 draws a midfielder closer to the Arsenal box and leaves more space for the other two Gunners midfielders in Arteta's 4-3-3.

Yet against Burnley, it was Rice dropping into the first line more: this isn't unusual for this season, but it was significant in Arsenal looking more threatening in the first half.

Declan Rice vacating the midfield helped Arsenal against a dreaded mid-block

Arsenal can play against physical teams, and they can play against teams offering more technical quality. They can play against high lines and their record against both those at the top and the bottom has been astounding for a while.

But it's those midtable sides like Fulham, Bournemouth and Brighton who caused the most problems for Arteta's side last term when they played in a resolute mid- to low-block.

The reason is somewhat tactical, exacerbated by the personnel picked by Arteta. Arsenal's best passers – Bukayo Saka, Martin Odegaard, Ethan Nwaneri – were often stacked on the right last term… with low-touch runners like Rice, Gabriel Martinelli or Mikel Merino on the left of the pitch.

Arteta doesn't want his midfield to be quite so rigid. Odegaard has done some of his best work when he's had the freedom to float into the left half-space, while Rice is best when he covers every blade of grass.

On Saturday, Arsenal lined up with Zubimendi in the no.6 role, Rice to the left of him, and Eberechi Eze to the right – but they didn't stay that way, with Zubimendi adding another degree of positional fluidity.

Rice dropping into the first line of the build-up allowed Eze to drift to the left, with Zubmendi to the right. With Burnley sitting off and Arsenal dictating play, they had two more incisive passers in Eze and Zubimendi in more dangerous areas ahead of Rice – who is the weakest of the three when receiving the ball between the lines.

The heat maps of all three show quite how positionally flexible the Arsenal midfield really was, with Rice receiving the ball deeper than Zubmendi or Eze, before taking on a more box-to-box role in the second half when the home side gained more possession a little more.

Arteta even dropped Zubmendi against West Ham United in a sign that he was prepared to give Eze and Odegaard the creative keys – but this weekend was the clearest indication that the Gunners are looking to double down on their own ideals in a bid to find new ways to win.

Tactics are highly dependent on the players carrying out instructions. But with Arsenal's squad now rich in multifaceted players capable of performing multiple roles within a game, Arteta's finding ways to solve problems as they arise in ways that he couldn't last season.

Ruben Amorim has faced increasing scrutiny over his tactics during a difficult 11 months in charge of Manchester United.

The United boss has refused to deviate from his favoured 3-4-2-1 formation since arriving at Old Trafford, despite a string of calamitous results.

Red Devils stars have reportedly been left 'confused' and 'frustrated' by Amorim's tactical inflexibility, but the Portuguese may have now found a way to make the formation better suit his players.

Manchester United legend praises 'clever' Amorim for tactical tweak

Amorim has won just 19 of his first 50 games in charge of Man United but he brought up his half century with a 2-0 victory over Sunderland at Old Trafford on Saturday, thanks to goals by Mason Mount and summer signing Benjamin Sesko.

United's formation listed Mount and Bryan Mbeumo as the two No.10s behind Sesko, but Mbeumo played notably closer to the Slovenian striker than in previous games - with fellow summer signing Matheus Cunha doing the same when he replaced Mount in the second half.

Speaking on Match of the Day on Saturday night, United legend Wayne Rooney - ranked at No.4 in FourFourTwo's list of the best Premier League strikers of all time - highlighted how this helped Amorim's side.

The former England captain said: ‘He [Amorim] simplified the game for the players and Mbeumo was getting a lot closer to Sesko, which really helped Manchester United. Especially in the first 30 minutes, Sunderland really struggled to deal with it.

“Because they’re close to each other, the three Sunderland defenders have to stay with them and that frees up the space for Amad [Diallo] to get at the Sunderland full-back in a 1v1 situation. Now, they’re both in the box, they’re both ready to get a sniff of a goal.

"Cunha comes on and nothing changes; ball up to Sesko, Cunha running in behind. It’s a subtle change but I think it was the right one. It was clever and Sunderland really struggled to cope with it."

Evidently from the team's approach against the Black Cats, Amorim and his cohort of strikers sat down to discuss the tweak to their respective roles, which ultimately had the desired effect.

Considering Man United have recorded the most shots in the division and the highest Expected Goals (xG) tally - 14.06 - according to Opta, there is a chance that once it begins to click, Amorim's football may eventually be vindicated.

The win lifted Man United to 10th in the Premier League going into the international break, with a daunting trip to Liverpool next up when top-flight football resumes.

If the Red Devils show a similar level of attacking threat at Anfield then they may finally have started to turn a corner under Amorim.

Formations in football weren't a thing in the early days. This was a sport purely consisting of dribblers and tacklers in the 1800s – but oh, how far we've come.

For the 50 or so years of the game, a 2-3-5 formation was the preferred mode across the game. It took Herbert Chapman of Arsenal to drop the middle player of that three deeper into the backline – hence the term, ‘centre-half’ – to a little disgruntlement from some, who believed defending as such as unsporting.

Over time, this W-M formation – named so for its resemblance to the letters – evolved even further. It was the Brazilians who dropped another player into the backline to form early 4-2-4 formations, while Helenio Herrera went even more defensive still, bolting the door on the attackers with his ‘catenaccio’ system.

Formations come into fashion before fading away, with the tides changing due to advancements in the sport. Changes in the offside rule, for example, are largely to blame for the sweeper's extinction in the modern game, which the development of sports science and player physicality in the 21st Century contributed to the renaissance of the high press and formations that suit it best.

In modern football, some managers choose to live or die by the one formation; others evolve along their careers. Ruben Amorim, for example, has virtually never played anything other than his trusty 3-4-3, while Carlo Ancelotti will famously bend his own ideas to the players at his disposal. Diego Simeone was a 4-4-2 evangelist at a time when it really wasn't popular to be; Marcelo Bielsa, meanwhile, famously coaches his players to play every formation he possibly can… while favouring an almost unique 3-4-3 with a diamond midfield.

Ultimately, they're all just numbers, aren't they? Well, you can split formations into four families.

• 2x CB, 2x CM: The most basic version of this is a 4-4-2. This gives you partnerships in the centre of defence and the centre of midfield to build with.
• 2x CB, 3x CM: Most commonly seen with the 4-3-3 shape, this provides a platform of a centre-back partnership, but establishes the more complicated three-man midfield, enabling you to grab a hold in midfield.
• 3x CB, 2x CM: From the 3-4-3 formation family, this combination shifts the trio further back, so you have more players in your own third – either to build up with or defend with.
• 3x CB, 3x CM: The most unusual formation family, most often seen with a 3-5-2, in which you aim to pack out both the defence and the midfield.

FourFourTwo has been at the forefront of footballing expertise for over 30 years, from a time in which almost the entirety of English football played with the formation we were named after, to an age in which footballing tactics are more idiosyncratic than ever.

In this tactical explainer, our experts will break down each formation family and its shapes, explain individual football terms and provide examples of teams who have played with these styles and systems in the modern game.

Don't forget that you can use our contents at the top of this page, too, for ease of access.

Full-back formations: four-at-the-back

Full-back formations: four-at-the-back

Brazil's 1958 vintage weren't the first team to ever field a back four – legendary European Cup winner Bela Guttman developed a similar system independently – but the Selecao helped opened the eyes of the world to the possibilities of this set-up with their maiden World Cup win.

A quartet in the backline consists of two centre-backs and two full-backs. The full-backs traditionally support the attack, safe in the knowledge that two defenders are left behind to protect the centre of the pitch from transitions – and when the 4-4-2 rose to prominence in the 1990s, it made sense to field back fours in order to mark the front two and wingers of opposing teams.

Since the all-out-attack-minded Brazilian side of the '50s though, the back four has evolved with plenty of different ideas.

2x CB, 2x CM: 4-4-2 and its variations

2x CB, 2x CM: 4-4-2 and its variations

The 4-4-2 formation is unfairly associated in 2026 with less tactical coaches. We would say it's unfair – we're a little biased, right – but the basis of the 4-4-2 is the perfect ”starter formation” for any coach looking to get into the game.

Three's a crowd on a pitch. This formation family pairs players up with one another: two centre-backs, a full-back with each winger, a double-pivot in midfield and two strikers. Set your team up like this or similarly, and essentially, they will coach themselves: doubling up, tracking each other and one of them sitting while the other goes forward.

This is a big reason why the 4-4-2 is such a popular pressing shape. This family of formations allow for easy communication and simplified roles.

4-4-2

4-4-2

Associated with the early years of the Premier League, Arrigo Sacchi's Milan and, well, Mike Bassett, the 4-4-2 is thought of as a bog-standard My First Formation. Originally attributed to Soviet mastermind Viktor Maslov, the formation's genius lies in its simplicity and its perfect balance between stability at the back, strength in midfield and a threat in attack.

A flat 4-4-2 can be easy to play through, however, and difficult for a team playing in it to progress forward: its 90º angles encourage either sideways passing or extremely vertical line-breaking. It's possible to have the perfect profiles for this shape – Manchester United's Treble-winning 1998/98 side fielded two incredibly well-rounded midfielders in Paul Scholes and Roy Keane, between two elite wingers in David Beckham and Ryan Giggs.

More often than not, however, you'll see managers crowbarring in a midfielder into a wide position, a drifting forward alongside a target man and one full-back who wants to bomb, while the other sits. It's in the intricacies of this formation becoming naturally asymmetrical that it starts to come to life.

4-4-1-1

4-4-1-1

The penalty box is usually only big enough for one striker at a time. In a 4-4-2-like shape, pairing a natural poacher with someone a little more creative is a common solution.

A shape adored by Diego Simeone, the 4-4-1-1 drops one man closer to the midfield to link play. Often, this player will be the playmaker. That relieves the burden a little on the wingers, who will likely pack out the midfield and try and establish numerical superiority as a result. This is an underdog's shape – one favoured by the likes of Sean Dyche and Leicester City's 2015/16 title-winners – perfect for workhorses and a talismanic no.10 a-like.

4-1-2-1-2 (4-4-2 diamond)

4-1-2-1-2 (4-4-2 diamond)

The 4-1-2-1-2 – AKA 4-4-2 diamond, named so for that shape in the middle – is halfway between a 4-4-2 and a 4-3-3. There are four midfielders in the centre of the pitch, yes. But really, it's a 4-3-3 with a no.10 and a front two.

Often, playing a no.10 means sacrificing defensive solidity elsewhere – but not in the 4-1-2-1-2, which overloads the centre of the pitch with four players. The one thing that can make this formation fly, however, is its biggest weakness: the onus of width is on the full-backs to attack with the ferocity of wing-backs and get back to defend in a back four. Real Madrid have won Champions Leagues with this shape, with Roberto Carlos, Marcelo – two of the best left-backs in the world in their peak – but not everyone has such a luxury.

The 4-1-2-1-2 is increasingly these days used by the likes of Andoni Iraola and Pep Guardiola as a pressing shape, as it allows for a front two press a backline while another player behind tracks the cover shadow.

4-1-3-2

4-1-3-2

The rare beast that is the 4-1-3-2 is a compromised 4-1-2-1-2. The no.10 withdraws into a midfield three, sitting ahead of a lone no.6, with the wider no.8s able to explore the half-spaces or wider on the ball.

Milan adopted a style somewhere between the 4-1-3-2 and 4-1-2-1-2 during Carlo Ancelotti's heydey but the issues remain the same: a lack of width and the insecurity of two centre-backs rather than three. It's relatively unproven as a system at the top level on a consistent basis.

4-2-3-1

4-2-3-1

One of the most popular formations of the 21st Century, Spain (2010), Germany (2014) and France (2018) have all won World Cups with the 4-2-3-1. It offers the clear communication of a 4-4-2, allows for a creative no.10 dictating the heart of the attack and can allow its wingers and full-backs to push on and attack, with a clear bank of four defensive players – two centre-backs and two no.6s – to protect against counter-attacks.

Like the 4-3-3, the 4-2-3-1 allows for managers to assign specific midfielders to no.6, no.8 and no.10 roles, and to move on the pitch depending on game-state. The no.10, for example might press alongside the centre-forward, while managers like Pep Guardiola and Enzo Maresca will use an inverted full-back to push the no.8 further into attack, leaving a 3-2 shape both in build-up and in rest defence.

In most cases, a 4-2-3-1 demands wingers to track back and allows the no.10 to form overloads on either side of the pitch. This is a flexible formation, however, with modern coaches employing a range of tactical roles in its traditional positions to turn this shape into a 3-2-5 in attack or a 6-2-2 in defence.

4-2-2-2 (4-4-2 magic square)

4-2-2-2 (4-4-2 magic square)

Synonymous with the Red Bull group and coaches such as Ralf Rangnick and Marco Rose, the 4-2-2-2 is a similar formation to the 4-1-2-1-2. It overloads the central areas of the pitch, just like its cousin – but rather than building around one central creative figure, it places two attackers in the half-spaces for extra damage.

While at Leeds United, 4-2-2-2 enthusiast Jesse Marsch even dropped wingers into the centre of the pitch during build-up, in what can be a free-flowing and devastating formation for a counter. Just like a diamond midfield, however, the box midfield has just the same weakness: it requires a hell of a full-back pairing to provide the width.

4-2-4

4-2-4

Modern football is all about winning the midfield battle so it's rare that the 4-2-4 actually rears its head unless one team is desperately chasing a game. It certainly exists though, with Jurgen Klopp fielding a version of it just so that he could include Diogo Jota alongside his trusted trio of Sadio Mane, Roberto Firmino and Mohamed Salah – and in big games, too.

Vincent Kompany's Bayern Munich have resembled a kind of 4-2-4, while Mikel Arteta's Arsenal experiments without Martin Odegaard in the autumn of 2024 saw a version of this formation, too. The common denominator? A world-class midfield enforcer or two to ensure you're not steamrollered in the middle.

2x CB, 3x CM: 4-3-3 and its variations

2x CB, 3x CM: 4-3-3 and its variations

The 4-3-3 shape and its offshoots owe it all to one position: the no.6 or ‘pivote’ in Spanish. Spain saw a sword where others saw a shield.

Defensive midfield was considered purely protective cover for the defence in English football for a long time, but the no.6 became the most important player in any team with a revolution at Barcelona. Johan Cruyff opined that moving a playmaker deeper into a no.6 berth would enable him to see the whole game, with the role becoming the nucleus of a 4-3-3, controlling, anticipating and making an entire team tick.

Of course, not everyone saw the humble defensive midfielder as quite so progressive. Claude Makelele leant his name to a destructive role in that area of the field, while Klopp preferred to pack out the three-man centre-of-the-park, rather than give it expression. Ultimately, every shape under this umbrella shares the same goal, however: each aims for numerical superiority in the middle of the pitch, in one form or another.

4-3-3

4-3-3

As the likes of Jose Mourinho and Pep Guardiola have shown the world in the 21st Century, the 4-3-3 allows for fluidity and coverage of key areas of the pitch for a team looking to dominate.

The shape creates passing triangles, meaning that there's always a team-mate within 60º of your body shape, while the key attackers have access to the most dangerous areas. The no.8s can play in the half-spaces, the full-backs can overlap their wide attackers – knowing that their two centre-backs are protected by a no.6 and possibly even both no.8s – and these wide-attackers can cut inside to support the centre-forward.

A three-man midfield can often outnumber its opposition, too, with modern managers asking either a defender to step up and join that overload, or a false nine to drop back. There's less defensive burden on the wide attackers to track back than in a 4-2-3-1, given the coverage that a three-man midfield offers, while the relatively equal balance of numbers in defence, midfield and attack makes the 4-3-3 a good formation to transition into another shape – perhaps as a Plan B, or just when you're defending or attacking. A lot of modern managers will ask their team to attack in a 3-2-5 shape, which the 4-3-3 is the natural basis for.

4-1-4-1

4-1-4-1

The 4-1-4-1 is a more conservative version of the 4-3-3… or a more aggressive version, if you're Marcelo Bielsa employing counter-pressing no.10s in the central midfield roles.

This formation still utilises a lone pivot but uses it more as a screener for the backline, with a four-man midfield ahead akin to one you might see across the centre of a 4-4-2. This is a formation that lends itself well off the ball: a 4-3-3 will resemble a 4-1-4-1 when the wide attackers double up with the full-backs to mark opposition wingers, giving the two no.8s/no.10s a little more freedom centrally. It can, however, leave that lone frontman rather isolated if you fail to link the midfield the attack sufficiently.

4-3-2-1 (Christmas tree)

4-3-2-1 (Christmas tree)

Associated with Terry Venables during his time at Tottenham, the 4-3-2-1 is sometimes referred to as the ‘Christmas tree’ for its progressively narrowing shape from defence to attack. Similarly to a 4-3-3, it requires three attackers – though the wingers are so narrow, they're a ‘2’ behind the ‘1’ frontman.

Some 4-3-3s will resemble this too, of course. The key is in whether your wide attackers are truly forwards or playing behind a striker… and whether you can generate enough width from the back four to make this shape work. It's another narrow formation that relies on the engine of your full-back pairing – but since the 4-3-2-1 offers a ton of numerical superiority centrally, it's relatively fluid in attack, Carlo Ancelotti found fielding a version of this during his Milan days.

4-5-1

4-5-1

Traditionally, there have been two ways to compete against more dominant teams: pack out the defence and protect the area in front of your own goal, or pack out the midfield and look to win balls higher up.

The 4-5-1 is similar to the 4-1-4-1, lacking the defined no.6 role – many teams who play one of these two formations are misattributed as playing the other one – and as a result, it comes with the same strengths and weaknesses. It's very good for doubling up on opposition wingers and can contain a midfield but can also isolate a forward.

Perhaps the best example of it working to a tee was Arsene Wenger's Champions League finalists, Arsenal in 2005/06, who used creative midfielders across the five-man midfield, anchored by Gilberto Silva, with Thierry Henry needing virtually no support whatsoever to win games all by himself.

4-6-0

4-6-0

The 4-6-0 was first used by Luciano Spalletti's Roma, fielding Francesco Totti as a trequartista rather than a proper striker, while Spain used it in Euro 2012, opting for six pass-happy midfielders and Cesc Fabregas as a runner from deep (intriguingly, not as a false nine, as is sometimes claimed).

It's virtually the same as a 4-3-3 – just without the obvious centre-forward. It all boils down to the front three and the semantics of whether you're playing with a false nine or no forward at all. It's an unusual shape in that its strengths and weaknesses are plainly obvious – bountiful midfield numbers, with the final third neglected – but find the right centre-forward and this is a shape that can click.

Wing-back formations: three/five-at-the-back

Wing-back formations: three/five-at-the-back

Three-at-the-back is often thought of as no more than a defensive-first solution: it's common to see managers chuck another defender into the mix to shore things up, after all. Given that so many managers split their attack into five channels, it makes sense to cover each with a defensive presence.

This is just one function of a back three or five, though – depending on how you view a wing-back. Three centre-backs can give you an extra body in build-up to play up the pitch: it can unleash your wide defenders high, too, allowing attackers in your team to play narrower and closer to goal.

Building from the back is a common philosophy to win titles. But it's how a three-man backline can allow the rest of the team to flourish that most managers choose it.

3x CB, 2x CM: 3-4-3 and its variations

3x CB, 2x CM: 3-4-3 and its variations

While the 4-3-3 relies on the communication and trust of a centre-back pairing behind the more complex three-man midfield, the 3-4-3 shape does the opposite. Like a three-man midfield, the middle centre-back is often the organiser, the best long passer and exerts the least stamina, with the two either side being the aggressive defenders who look to play progress play, even dribbling forward.

Placing the numerical superiority further back allows for another benefit: with the rise of the high press has come the rise of building play out from the back. The most common build-up shape is a 3-2 – with three defenders in the first line and two midfielders in the second – all about a 60º angle away from one another. While some managers contort a back four to make this shape, others use a simple 3-4-3 – or variant – with wing-backs providing support in attack.

3-4-3

3-4-3

The formation, “3-4-3” can be used to describe any variant of the shape with three attackers, whether one or two of those attackers are withdrawn. But 3-4-3s with wide attackers – akin to a 4-3-3's wide-men – still have their place in the modern game.

Thomas Tuchel's Chelsea played a form of this with three attackers pressing high in the side and no fixed idea of which ones would drop deep to link with the midfield. Mikel Arteta's Arsenal won an FA Cup in 2020 with Nicolas Pepe and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang either side of Alexandre Lacazette, in what was an attack-heavy front three ahead of width-holding wing-backs, while Arteta's mentor, Pep Guardiola, has at times operated with this formation, too – using it to match up with back-three enthusiasts Tuchel and Antonio Conte when he faced them both in the Premier League.

3-4-2-1

3-4-2-1

The version of the 3-4-3 that Antonio Conte brought into vogue in the Premier League and beyond, this version of the formation uses two attackers behind a central striker, rather than beside. While both players can get up and support their no.9, they can also drop into more of an attacking midfield position, forming a box midfield with the double-pivot behind them.

The 3-4-2-1 has become the three-at-the-back formation of choice in the modern game because it offers this numerical superiority in the centre of the park, ahead of a sturdy defensive base and consistent width from the wing-backs. It can transition very easily into a 3-2-5 to dominate in the final third – as Bayer Leverkusen have done under Xabi Alonso – while its attacking midfielders can be given a huge amount of creative expression with a manager able to choose up to seven defensive players behind them.

The key to this formation – and many other back-three systems – lies in that very balance. Employ a mercurial talent like Eden Hazard in Chelsea's 2016/17 3-4-2-1 and you can unleash a superstar behind what is essentially two brick walls. But this formation relies on a smattering of players equally good going forward as backwards. Finding free-flowing expression from such a rigid structure is tricky for any coach.

3-4-1-2

3-4-1-2

Some consider this shape a kind of 3-5-2, thanks to the presence of three midfielders, even if one is advanced of the other two – but the double-pivot behind a central creative force at no.10 distinguish this formation firmly as a 3-4-3 with a variation in the front three.

This is a shape that can help carry a ‘luxury player’ in attacking midfield role – Unai Emery opted to use it in his Arsenal days to get Mesut Ozil behind Aubameyang and Lacazette without sacrificing solidity behind them – but the same issues can exist as with any 3-4-3. The presence of up to seven defensive-minded players needs to be weighed up, however good the 3-4-1-2 is for its duel-ability to both soak up pressure and provide an expressive playmaker.

3-2-4-1 (3-box-3)

3-2-4-1 (3-box-3)

The super-attacking 3-2-4-1 with which Manchester City won a Treble in 2022/23 was born from a simple 4-3-3. With centre-backs across the backline, Pep Guardiola pushed the no.8s up to support in a five-man attack across the channels, with one of the defenders joining the no.6 to build a double-pivot. This shape became so renowned that City were listed in line-up as playing with it from the start – and often did in games in which they sought to dominate and pen opponents in their own third.

The benefits are huge. The 3-2-4-1 offers that common 3-2 build-up with 60º angles for players to pass around, while the same passing triangles appear in the attack. The double-pivot provides a sturdy base in defensive transition, while one of those two midfielders can drop back into the first line to recreate a 4-3-3/4-1-4-1 shape if need be. A box midfield offers dominance centrally – and attacking midfielders in the half-spaces – while the lack of traditional full-backs means that you can dedicate those two roles to players who are perhaps a little more rounded as players.

But this shape isn't without its drawbacks. While passing triangles are prevalent in defence and attack, the sharp 90º angles from the defensive midfield ‘2’ to its attacking midfielders ahead force verticality, while the lack of overlap from any full-backs means that wide men can struggle to impact games without positional fluidity. This is a formation that suits a team with specific dynamics in defence and forward areas: when it comes together, it can blow teams away but requires high levels of technical quality and movement.

3-1-3-3 (3-diamond-3)

3-1-3-3 (3-diamond-3)

A formation that has foundations in the ‘total football’ philosophy of the Netherlands, the 3-1-3-3 – sometimes referred to 3-diamond-3 or 3-4-3 diamond – is also referred to as a 3-3-3-1 or 3-3-1-3, depending on whether you wish to emphasise the no.6, no.10 or no.9. While this shape could also be considered part of the 3-5-2 family, it's listed here for the same reasons a 4-1-2-1-2 is considered a 4-4-2 and not a 4-3-3 (still following?): it rotates a four-man midfield.

A staple of Barcelona teams under Johan Cruyff and Pep Guardiola, as well as various Marcelo Bielsa sides, the formation builds around a central lone pivot but offers numerical superiority in the shape of three other midfielders around. It provides passing triangles across the pitch and enables its midfielders to drift and find spaces in the attack – while off the ball, the no.8s can drop back and provide a kind of back six if need be.

The existence of the lone no.6 and lone no.10 can be easily targetable, however, requiring the players in this shape to be incredibly well-drilled and diligent with their movement and positioning. The 3-2-4-1's issue of the forwards struggling to get into the game exists, too, while wide areas are easy to target with a 3-1-3-3 if the midfield isn't coordinated to defend these spaces. It's no wonder that this is a shape used by coaches who preach cohesion and incredible levels of fitness.

5-2-2-1

5-2-2-1

One way to prepare your team to soak up pressure without immediately ceding the midfield battle is to turn a back three into a five – by dropping the wing-backs – and bringing a box midfield into the centre of the park.

This is a shape that plenty of 3-4-2-1 managers will adopt in a low block, though some choose to start with it and counter-attack. Its strengths in defensive numbers are obvious but it asks a lot of its four-man midfield to get onto the ball. It can be incredibly isolating for a no.9 without any obvious area for a runner to support.

5-4-1

5-4-1

Like the 5-2-2-1, the 5-4-1 can be an optimum solution for soaking up pressure but comes with the same drawbacks of isolating its no.9. It allows for two wingers to double up on opposing wide attackers while usually asking for its double-pivot to also screen that back five.

As you can imagine, up to nine defensive presences in this one formation mean that it isn't a particularly popular one among ambitious coaches – but it's still found success over the last couple of decades from managers looking to shut up shop against significantly more talented teams. If you can't relieve 90 minutes of pressure every now and then with your lone forward holding up the ball and encouraging the rest of the team up the pitch, however, it's a long old afternoon employing this shape.

3x CB, 3x CM: 3-5-2 and its variations

3x CB, 3x CM: 3-5-2 and its variations

Why choose between three centre-backs and three central midfielders?

That's the thought process of the likes of Rudi Garcia, Diego Simeone, Thomas Frank and Simone Inzaghi, whose 3-5-2 shapes are far less conservative than at first glance. The 3-5-2 enables for central coverage in the first and second phase, giving a manager optimum control without sacrificing the space in front of the goalkeeper – and while this family of formations is the most unusual, there are famous examples of this basic shape thriving in the modern game.

3-5-2

3-5-2

The 3-5-2 offers key coverage from the back forward. The three centre-backs offer numerical superiority during build-up, while in theory, three midfielders controlling and dictating in the centre of the park means that the wing-backs can be a little less box-to-box – though they're still key to both the defensive and offensive potential of this shape.

The attack offers a double threat, too, with this shape often combining little-and-large partnerships in attack. There's no luxury playmaker, however, with the 3-5-2 a little less expressive than a 3-4-1-2 – unless the no.8s can drift higher into the half-spaces.

3-5-1-1

3-5-1-1

The 3-5-1-1 carries the same strengths as the 3-5-2, though makes a clear distinction in attack: one forward will link play with the midfield, while the other toils further ahead.

While this shape can enable a little more creativity than its sibling, it places a heavier burden on the no.9. England used this shape to incredible effect at the 2018 World Cup, using Harry Kane as a complete forward capable of holding up the ball, not just for Raheem Sterling behind him, but for no.8s Jesse Lingard and Dele Alli to get involved in attack as spare men, while Sterling himself could attract defenders to him with his movement in what was essentially a free-roaming role.

5-3-2

5-3-2

The 5-3-2 and 4-4-2 are the two most popular deep block formations in the modern age. This is thanks to the presence of two clear targets in attack, with one able to win aerial duels for the other to run onto.

There is a choice to be made on whether you favour the 5-3 or 4-4 shape, however. As mentioned further up, a 4-4-2 is the easiest shape to coach, offering ample coverage in two blocks of four across the key areas of the pitch when a team remains compact – but the 5-3-2 offers five defenders to each defend a five-man attack, a three-man midfield to offer control and preferable passing angles in build-up to a 4-4-2.

For some coaches, the build-up in a low block is entirely bypassed with route one balls up to the target men, making the 4-4-2 an easier choice for communication. But when well-coached, a 5-3-2 can be a phenomenally difficult shape to break down, with even more progressive coaches like Ruben Amorim and Mikel Arteta employing it expertly to stump better teams in big games.

Frequently asked questions

Liverpool have started life brilliantly under Arne Slot, with the Dutchman's side currently top of the Premier League, into the League Cup final and comfortably through in the Champions League.

Not many - whether of a Liverpool persuasion or not - would have predicted such a convincing start to Arne Slot's tenure at Anfield, especially considering he had to replace fan-favourite Jurgen Klopp in the process.

But Slot has brought with him a set of beliefs and his own ideas that have helped Liverpool thrive and kick on a gear this term, while still remaining loyal to the same fantastic players that proved so important to Klopp.

Liverpool manager Arne Slot impressing former players

Former Liverpool strikers Emile Heskey and Michael Owen have been particularly impressed with not only Slot's tactical approach, but also his personality.

“Slot hasn’t come in and decided to change everything, making it all about himself – it’s been about the players he’s inherited, getting the best out of a system he likes and getting the players to understand that system," Heskey exclusively tells FourFourTwo.

“We’ve seen several times at other clubs that players don’t necessarily get it straight away. He’s come in and managed to do that. He’s brought his own philosophy, made subtle changes and presented himself brilliantly to the media and fans.”

Heskey's former Reds and England team-mate Owen agrees, with Slot's clear change in approach making the side a lot more resolute while still retaining their attacking threat throughout games.

“It’s a lot more controlled and possession-based, they don’t like giving the ball away and taking so many risks,” Owen exclusively tells FourFourTwo.

“They’re far less vulnerable defensively. I used to watch Jurgen Klopp teams and think matches could end 4-0, 5-0 6-0. I never necessarily think that now, more a controlled 2-0 win every time they go on to the pitch.”

“He’s calm,” Owen adds. “I’ve really been impressed with his demeanour – it was important he came in and was himself, not trying to copy Klopp. He’s been absolutely everything you’d want in a Liverpool manager, everything you’d want in a successor to Klopp.”

In FourFourTwo's view, it's certainly a surprise that Liverpool are playing so well so quickly since Slot arrived at the club. Sticking with pretty much the exact same players Klopp had at his disposal is largely uncommon for managers to do in the modern game, but it's worked brilliantly for the Dutchman.

Manchester United manager Ruben Amorim has left certain key players "confused" with his tactical approach, as the club goes through another rebuild.

Amorim arrived last November tasked with turning Manchester United's fortunes around as quickly as possible, but things haven't quite worked out as he would've hoped. They still sit 13th in the Premier League and have flattered to deceive so far in the Europa League and FA Cup, while Marcus Rashford, Antony and Tyrell Malacia all departed Old Trafford in January.

But while the aforementioned trio were unfancied by Amorim, other players the Portuguese boss clearly wants to succeed have struggled to adapt to his methods - causing accusations of "confusion" over a certain star.

Manchester United tactics leaving individual 'confused'

Kobbie Mainoo first broke into the Manchester United team midway through the 2023/24 season, and rapidly became one of the side's standout performers operating in central midfield. His progress has stalled somewhat this term, however, as the 19-year-old learns new positions under Amorim.

Despite starting a number of games for Amorim in his natural centre midfield position, recent matches have seen Mainoo operate in a more advanced role, culiminating in him playing as a false nine against Crystal Palace at Old Trafford in the Premier League.

Former Aston Villa, Chelsea and Marseille forward Tony Cascarino has claimed this changing of system and position isn't helping Mainoo whatsoever, and is leaving him unsure about what the manager really wants of him on the pitch.

"When he [Mainoo] first came into the Manchester United team, I thought he really did it at a breeze," Cascarino said on Talksport. "It was quite comfortable for him, he felt confident on the ball, he knew what he was wanting to try and achieve.

"I think he looks a confused footballer now. Because Kobbie is going backward too often. I think he feels he's afraid to lose the ball, and that's what can happen when you get into a really technical setup. I'm watching Kobbie Mainoo, and I think he doesn't really know what he's meant to do now. I feel sorry for him because he's 19, and he's learning on the job.

"When he first broke in, everything about his game was spot on. He's gone from a central midfielder, to an attacking midfielder to a centre forward. He's the future of Manchester United. He's in a position that isn't natural for him."

In FourFourTwo's view, it does seem odd that Mainoo is playing so far forward at the moment, especially when Bruno Fernandes is operating slightly deeper. It would make more sense for their positions to swap, because Mainoo proved his capabilities last term for both Manchester United and England.

Amorim clearly believes that the positional change will work, however, which might have a long-term vision associated to it.

Manchester United continue to reach new lows with each passing week.

A Jean-Philippe Mateta brace condemned the Red Devils just a few days ago with Ruben Amorim forced to watch on as his side was beaten on home soil once again. Injuries are piling up and his strikers cannot score, so when does it start to get better for the 40-year-old?

One former player has insisted he is being left bewildered by the tactics deployed by the former Sporting boss in recent weeks, believing even in his heyday, it would leave him feeling confused.

Paul Scholes SLAMS Ruben Amorim regarding his pre-match Manchester United routines

Manchester United have changed their warm-up routines drastically since Amorim's appointment, appearing to focus on their shape with and without the ball before kick-off.

It is something we rarely witnessed under former coach Erik ten Hag, as the Red Devils players are asked to quickly transition between positions where they are likely to find themselves on the pitch.

“Life is sucked out of footballers today because it’s so tactical," began Paul Scholes when speaking via The Overlap recently. "Last couple of games I watched their warm-up and they’re doing team shape with the back five, in and out of [possession of the] ball.

“They even started doing set pieces in front of everyone. C’mon, it’s a warm-up. You want to get your touch right, want to enjoy it and kick the ball. Everything is just so intricate and tactical. My head will be fried!”

“Trying to work out the tactical element of football matches doesn’t fascinate me," he added.

"I want to see good bits of play, defenders firing the ball into the midfield, a winger taking on their full-back, so I’m not looking at the tactics, but maybe I should be.”

In FourFourTwo's view, Scholes is perhaps naive to not point out the fact that Manchester United's players are learning a brand-new system midway through a season. That in itself presents a new challenge and Amorim is likely to be given enough time to help his squad work out what to do in their new look 3-4-2-1 style of play.

Manchester United are back in action on Friday at Old Trafford as they take on Leicester City in the fourth round.

Liverpool hero Bruce Grobbelaar has defended his actions from the penalty shootout of the 1984 European Cup, in which he performed his famous 'spaghetti legs'.

With the 1984 final 1-1 after extra-time between Liverpool and Roma, Grobbelaar knew that he needed to step up for his team if they were to complete a treble that season, having already won the league title and League Cup.

The Zimbabwean goalkeeper's task became all the more difficult when his team-mate, Steve Nicol, stepped up first in the shootout and missed. With the Reds at a disadvantage, Grobbelaar recalls what manager Joe Fagan said to him before the penalties started.

Liverpool helped out by Bruce Grobbelaar and his 'spaghetti legs'

“[Assistant] Ronnie Moran’s words to me were, ‘Do not change yourself as a person, never emulate anybody else as a goalkeeper. Be yourself’. We really should have won that European Cup final in extra time, but couldn’t take our chances," Grobbelaar tells FourFourTwo.

"Just before the penalties, [boss] Joe Fagan said, ‘Listen, we shouldn’t be in this position, nobody will blame you’. As I walked away, he told me to try to put them off. I picked out two players – Italy stars Bruno Conti and Francesco Graziani.

"People said it was unsporting, but my logic was if an international player can’t hit the target from 12 yards, it’s not my fault.”

Both Conti and Graziani missed in the shootout, with Grobbelaar's 'spaghetti legs' putting the Italian duo off. After Nicol had missed first, the Reds now had the advantage, with fith taker Alan Kennedy knowing that a goal would hand Liverpool their fourth European Cup.

The left-back duly dispatched his spot kick, helping Liverpool beat Roma in their own stadium.

But while Grobbelar faced some accusations of unsporting behaviour after his antics in the shootout, FourFourTwo believes that he had every right to do what he did and put off his opponents.

Incoming Manchester United manager Ruben Amorim has dropped a major hint over the tactical direction he plans to take upon arrival at Old Trafford.

The Portuguese coach arrives off the back of a remarkable spell in charge of Sporting CP, guiding the club to two Liga Portugal titles and two Taça de Portugals in just four years at the club.

Amorim who ranked at No.11 in FourFourTwo's list of the best managers in the world right now, gave the Sporting fans the perfect send-off last week by guiding his side to an historic 4-1 victory over reigning Premier League champions Manchester City in the Champions League.

Ruben Amorim confirms his tactical approach at Manchester United

Amorim's Sporting side has become synonymous with a three-back formation, allowing for fluidity in the attacking third, helped further by the imperious form of striker Viktor Gyokeres.

The 39-year-old has gained plenty of plaudits for his attractive attacking football leading Manchester United fans to feel a sense of excitement regarding how he could set up his side upon arrival at Old Trafford.

The free-flowing attacking football of the 1990s and 2000s under Sir Alex Ferguson has been firmly left in the past in the red half of Manchester, with the club currently sitting 17th in the Premier League for goals scored this season.

Amorim, however, looks set to bring back the feel-good factor at Old Trafford after revealing he plans to stick to his tactical roots after making the switch.

“I feel ready for the new challenge,” he told reporters after his final match as Sporting manager.

“I’m not naive, I know it’s going to be very different, very difficult. I’m at peace now, I can focus on my new job and I’m looking forward to starting tomorrow."

On his tactical stance he added: “I have to start from something I know very well (three at the back) and then develop that with the players.

“We don’t have much time to train, there are many games, so I’ll start from a structure I know very well.”

Amorim's first game in charge will be a trip to Portman Road to take on Ipswich Town, managed by former United coach Kieran McKenna, who recently picked up their first win of the season away to Tottenham Hotspur.

McKenna's side have risen through the divisions in recent years with their own brand of attractive attacking football, providing a solid early test to the new manager's methods.

Thomas Tuchel has officially been named the next England manager.

The 51-year-old will begin work in January 2025 and is ultimately tasked with ensuring silverware for this ever-talented group of Three Lions players. Former boss Gareth Southgate led England to two consecutive European Championships finals, only to fall at the final hurdle on both occasions.

With pressure higher than ever, Tuchel's know-how will be tested for the first time in international football, with intrigue growing over his tactical nuisance. Will we see England set up differently under the talented German coach?

How will England approach games tactically under Thomas Tuchel?

During his last managerial role at Bayern Munich, Tuchel operated in a traditional 4-2-3-1, system, with England captain Harry Kane leading the line for his side.

This system has become extremely popular in modern football due to its stability and safety around the pitch. Southgate and interim boss Lee Carsley both used the formation during their spells with the Three Lions, too.

Furthermore, as seen in the image above, the former PSG boss used a 3-4-2-1 system with Chelsea during their successful Champions League campaign in 2021.

The formation was then adapted to become a 5-4-1 when the team fell out of possession, making it hard for teams to break down the Blues backline. Reece James and Ben Chilwell were pivotal in the system, offering superb width and subsequent defensive cover as full-backs.

This could mean that both Chilwell and James could be recalled, given the pair were praised so highly for their efforts during Chelsea's European success. Chilwell has been frozen out under new manager Enzo Maresca, whilst James has struggled with continuing injuries across the last two seasons.

In FourFourTwo's view, it seems likely that Tuchel may use his 4-2-3-1 system that worked so well at Bayern Munich, but who knows, he may have new ideas he wishes to try out.

FourFourTwo's German football expert, Ed McCambridge: Tuchel is intelligent, tactically astute, outspoken and fiery

“The despair on the island must be immense if they’ve come to the conclusion that only a German can end their long wait for titles. What a tribute to Thomas Tuchel and German football that the English are willing to put our great rivalry aside.”

So wrote this morning Matthias Brugelmann, columnist for German outlet Sportbild, whose print and digital output is dominated by the news that Tuchel is England’s new manager. Make no mistake: this appointment is almost as sensational in Deutschland as it is in England.

It’s not hard to see why, given Tuchel’s standing as a coach and a personality in Germany. He is regarded as one of the finest modern managers – a pressing disciple of Ralf Rangnick with an added dash of Jose Mourinho’s dark arts. His Borussia Dortmund team could press relentlessly; his Chelsea team could squeeze the angles and eliminate space. He’s intelligent and tactically astute. Yet he’s also outspoken and fiery. Not one or the other but both, always.

At juggernauts Bayern and PSG, he proved he could win league titles, but far more applicable to England has been his ability to drag lesser sides to famous cup victories. Leading a hodgepodge Chelsea to the 2021 Champions League is undoubtedly his greatest achievement to date and German football fans will be aware of his ability to force results if the two nations clash at the 2026 World Cup.

The despair on the island is real. But Germany’s is also palpable following the FA’s latest appointment.

EA FC 25 has a brand new tactics system that makes battles on the pitch far more exciting than ever before. This year, you can adapt your team's play on and off the ball as well as find players specific to your playstyle with the new Player Roles.

We've had an in-depth play with the game and we're going to show you how to install any tactic you find online as well as list 25 of the best FC IQ tactics you can use right now that we've found online. These will help you get used to the game-changing updates – and remember to be sure to check out attacking tips or defensive tips while you're at it.

It's worth noting that tactics are incredibly subjective so the best tactics for us here at FourFourTwo might not be the best for you. We suggest trialling and tweaking each of these tactics one by one until you find your perfect fit…

How to use an FC IQ tactics code in EA FC 25

To enter an FC IQ tactics code you'll need to have a full squad with 11 players in your starting lineup. From there, press the left stick to open up the side menu and select Team Management.

Move to the right and press A on Xbox or X on Playstation to import a tactic using a code. Enter one of the codes below to gain access to a custom tactic created by some of the best content creators and professional FC players in the world

EA FC 25: Custom tactics codes

Each one of these codes is case sensitive, so make sure you're typing them out exactly as we've detailed them above. We'll add new formations and tactics to this list regularly so make sure to bookmark this page and come back often to find the best tactic for your Ultimate Team in FC 25.

Become a tinkerman

While it's easy to just copy a code and import a tactic, we highly recommend catering your custom tactic to your exact team. This year in EA FC 25 more so than ever before, you need to find players that match your preferred tactics rather than shoehorn in your favourite players to a formation that doesn't suit them.

A great example of this is Eden Hazard, who's brand new Hero card is excellent on the wing. His perfect position is as a Left Midfielder with the Inverted Winger ++ Player Role, this means he fits best into formations like the 4-4-2 or 4-5-1 rather than a Left Winger in a 4-3-3. This is worth noting for all of the formations listed above: Make sure to pick players that fit best into each position and Player Role, it's the fastest way to get a winning record in Ultimate Team this year.

It’s been another wild summer at Stamford Bridge, with Chelsea changing managers, wheeling and dealing in the transfer market and suffering a number of poor preseason results. 

The club’s financial manoeuvres in recent seasons are well documented, with the Todd Boehly regime throwing money around like it was going out of fashion before the Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) bill came in. This has seen them sell several academy players, as homegrown sales go down as pure profit in the accounts. 

And it would appear that teams are cottoning onto the fact that Chelsea are willing to sell their best young stars, with Real Madrid and Paris Saint-Germain said to be targeting one of the club’s leading prospects. 

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Eighteen-year-old defender Josh Acheampong is seen as one of the best prospects coming out of the club’s Cobham academy and the Independent report that the two European giants are looking to take advantage of Chelsea’s willingness to sacrifice young players to meet their PSR commitments.

With 44 players on their books, the Chelsea squad is bloated and the report adds that the Blues are willing to sell Acheampong, who can play at right-back and centre-back and is rated as a similar prospect to Leny Yoro, who Manchester United have bought from Lille for £52million this summer.

But while Yoro had played 60 senior games before his move, Acheampong’s lack of first-team action means Real Madrid and PSG believe a deal can be done for €15million, with Chelsea’s PSR standing and the size of their squad also contributing to this cut price valuation.

Chelsea are set to sell Conor Gallagher to Atletico Madrid, while another academy graduate Trevoh Chalobah is also likely to leave this summer.

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Eddie Howe has been linked with the England job after three largely successful years with Newcastle United – and Magpies winger Harvey Barnes has been full of praise for his manager.

Howe followed Steve Bruce as Newcastle boss when he was appointed manager in November 2021, moving the club away from relegation trouble in his first season at the helm.

The 46-year-old then followed that up by impressively guiding the club into the Champions League during the 2022/23 campaign – the club’s fourth-placed finish saw them return to Europe’s elite competition for the first time since 2004.

VIDEO: Why Signing Archie Gray Was A Masterstroke By Spurs

Last season was more difficult, as Howe’s squad struggled to cope with the workload of the extra games, leading to more injury absentees.

Barnes was signed from Leicester City last summer and began his Newcastle career with a goal and an assist in a 5-1 opening-day win against Aston Villa last August – six weeks later though, a foot injury sustained early in the Magpies’ 8-0 rout of Sheffield United at Bramall Lane would ultimately keep him sidelined until February.

Even though he only started only seven league games last term, he believes that a year of working under Howe has helped him.

“I’ve learned a lot and I’m sure this year I’ll be learning a lot more,” the 26-year-old tells FourFourTwo. “He’s great to work under. He comes across as very calm, but he has an intense side to him.

"I’ve only been at the club for a year and I was injured for some of it, but the tactical things I have learned are things I’ve never seen before.”

Newcastle begin their Premier League season at home to newly-promoted Southampton at St James’ Park on August 17, before their first away game against Howe’s old club Bournemouth at the Vitality Stadium eight days later.

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Harry Kane’s relative anonymity has been a concern for England at Euro 2024. While the Three Lions have made it to the semi-final, their star striker has struggled to fire in attack.

And that could partly be down to his position within Gareth Southgate’s system. Despite his potency for Bayern Munich this season, Kane has been operating in a remarkably deep-lying role with England.

As analysed by our own Adam Clery in his latest video for FourFourTwo's YouTube, Kane’s average position against Switzerland in the quarter-final was deeper than BOTH Jude Bellingham and Phil Foden. The former Spurs striker does often look to seek out the ball, but more worryingly for England he made just nine passes throughout the game.

How England's New System (Somehow) Beat Switzerland

Kane’s apparent reluctance to get into advanced positions, whether tactical or not, has reduced England’s goal threat, with balls into the box from wide areas proving ineffective. It also caused issues defensively: with no focal point up front, the ball kept coming back at England during periods of the game.

Kane was eventually withdrawn in extra-time after clattering into the dugout (and very nearly taking out Southgate in the process). Ivan Toney, a far more traditional striker, replaced him and held his position in attack.

Whether Southgate will make the bold decision to drop one of world football’s greatest goal scorers for a European Championship semi-final remains to be seen. But what is clear is that Kane’s role likely needs to be tweaked.

The Bayern forward clearly still has the backing of his teammates. Liverpool's Trent Alexander-Arnold said: “Anyone who is facing England would like to see Harry Kane not playing.

“I think we are talking about England’s record goalscorer so that is as big as anything you can say about him. You just know he is a threat. Anything in and around the box, you need to be on red alert. He can finish it from any angle.

"I always say he is the best finisher I have seen or played with. He can find the back of the net from anywhere. He can drop down and build play up and his hold-up play is incredible, too. All round, a fantastic player.”

In my opinion, Harry Kane has struggled to find form and looks to be in need of a rest, dropping him would likely be rash at this stage of the tournament. He is capable, on his day, of producing a match-winning moment, while Ivan Toney and Ollie Watkins remain relatively unproven on the international stage.

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In Ben Lerner’s novel Leaving the Atocha Station, a character stands on the bank of a river, nervous and scared, as her boyfriend urges her to jump in. She wants nothing more than to walk away, to say no, to follow her instinct. But she succumbs to the pressure and jumps in, only to be swept away by the tide, flailing desperately. She is found soon after downstream, having drowned.

“This just is the world,” Lerner writes. “Things like this happen. One can be as cautious as one wants, can waste one’s life being cautious, but there is no avoiding the reality of death.”

Gareth Southgate might find himself pondering similar philosophical ideas. He is, metaphorically speaking, standing on the riverbank, unable to fully commit and jump in. That might mean death, or in this case elimination from Euro 2024, an outcome that must be avoided at all costs. 

How England's New System (Somehow) Beat Switzerland

The metaphor may feel a little forced, but the principles apply. If the character in Lerner’s novel had refused to jump into the river, turned around and went home, she would have felt guilt, a cowardly sense of dissatisfaction. She would have been alive but inhibited and encumbered by anxiety and cautiousness.

That is how England, and indeed France and several other teams at Euro 2024, have likely felt this summer. They have stayed alive, avoided any recklessness that might lead to disaster, but it has been joyless, filled with fear and trepidation. It has been all about the destination, not the journey.

Plenty will argue that this is fine if England go on to win the tournament. Who will remember or even care how the team played if the trophy is lifted in Berlin later this week? It is about the glory, the success, the accolades. In part, of course, that is true.

But in reality, scraping through a tournament playing dour, unadventurous football will certainly be remembered. The fans at the games, the disillusioned supporters watching, increasingly listless, in front of the TV, will remember how drab it was. Some won’t mind. Some will insist that all that matters is the end result. But there is, for most people, more to life than winning.

There is an emerging discontent among football fans about the sport’s move towards cautiousness. Top teams, generally speaking, prioritise safe possession, patient probing, minimal risk. Individualism is discouraged, off-piste moments of skill or invention are increasingly rare. Surviving, making it to the end, is more important than anything else.

A significant percentage of managers, Southgate included, are now intent on establishing control. Being swept away by the tide of a match is undesirable. The result is that games are often cagey; long periods are spent retaining possession, waiting for an opening that can be exploited with minimal risk. That does not make for a great spectacle.

The counterargument is that winning is all that matters in sport. The game evolves and tactical trends emerge, but the end goal always remains the same. There is no obligation to entertain the crowd or the viewers paying extortionate prices to watch on TV. It is, ultimately, about competition.

But the question remains: what is the point of it all if it becomes joyless? When teams with incredibly gifted players are too afraid to take the handbrake off, when instead they choose to avoid any potential pitfalls and keep their opposition at arm’s length, watching can become a frustrating, dispiriting experience.

There are still exciting, positive teams, of course. Spain have often thrilled at Euro 2024, allowing Lamine Yamal and Nico Williams the freedom to drive at defenders. But they are the exception. In an age of automation and systems, talented individuals are often restricted and held back.

How much of that you can tolerate depends on your outlook. But there is no doubt that playing a more forward-thinking brand of football can reap rewards in many ways. Eventually, even the most cautious, self-preserving teams will come unstuck. And when they do, whether it is in a quarter-final or a final, how will that feel? 

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And former England defender Gary Neville has called on Gareth Southgate and co. to evoke the spirit of the Three Lions famous thrashing of the Netherlands at Euro 96.

England need to be prepared to handle a ‘step up’ in the quality of their next opponents at Euro 2024 after learning they will face the Netherlands with a place in the final on the line, according to Gary Neville.

Ronald Koeman’s side fought back from a goal down to beat Turkey 2-1 just a couple of hours after England had seen off Switzerland on penalties in the earlier kick-off on Saturday evening.

The Westfalenstadion now awaits on Wednesday evening to find out who will earn the honour of facing either France or Spain (who meet on Tuesday night) in next Sunday’s final.

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Had Groups C and D shaken out according to pre-tournament expectations – with England topping their group and the Netherlands finishing second to France – the two sides would already have met by now, but they didn’t, so they haven’t.

Speaking as an ITV pundit after the Dutch comeback, Neville said: “It's a proper game. It could have happened, obviously, in the second round, couldn't it? We ended up with Slovakia…but you're always going to face the best teams at some point in the competition.

“I think England's route, so far, has been pretty favourable. This is a step up, obviously, on Wednesday, but you'd expect that in a semi-final it's going to be a fantastic match, obviously, in Dortmund’s stadium.”

Neville lined up alongside Gareth Southgate in the England defence when the two sides last faced off at a major summer tournament, with England claiming a 4-1 win thanks to two goals apiece from Alan Shearer and Teddy Sheringham.

The former Manchester United right-back is naturally hoping that England can replicate that with even more on the line on Wednesday evening, saying: “[It brings back] memories of 96 – the last time we played the Dutch in a major tournament.

“It was one of England's most memorable performances. It was a tactical masterclass from Terry Venables, and obviously Gareth was there as well.”

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England may have got their Euro 2024 campaign off to a winning start on Sunday night, but the 1-0 victory over Serbia was one for the purists. 

It all started well, with England fizzing the ball around for the opening 20 or so minutes, as the omnipresent Jude Bellingham buzzed around the pitch and put Gareth Southgate’s men 1-0 up. 

But then it all got somewhat flat. As Harry Kane toiled in the centre circle and England’s main supply line on the right-hand side dried, the Serbs’ effective pressing threatened to peg the Three Lions back. 

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England would hold on, but the manner of the victory saw some familiar criticism of Southgate’s penchant for the kind of safety-first football we’ve seen in previous tournaments.

The win came at the end of a long weekend of football-watching, so perhaps you could be forgiven if your eyelids became heavy during that second half of Three Lions toil and attrition.

And it would appear that this was the case for one England fan who was actually present in the Veltins-Arena in Gelsenkirchen, as he woke up at 4am, hours after the game had finished.

The bleary-eyed supporter uploaded a video to TikTok, looking the worse for wear sitting on one of the back rows of a deserted Veltins-Arena.

“I’ve just woken up. It’s four o’clock in the morning,” he mumbles before turning the camera around to show the thousands of empty seats across the stadium after seeming to evade the stewards all night.

Here’s hoping that England’s performance against Denmark on Thursday afternoon is enough to keep each and every fan in Frankfurt awake.

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Manchester United goalkeeper Andre Onana has explained what the club have been trying to achieve by building out from the back as they have under Erik ten Hag.

The Cameroon international has attempted among the most passes of any stopper in the Premier League this season, with only Fulham’s Bernd Leno and Tottenham’s Guglielmo Vicario using their feet more other than when taking goal kicks.

Speaking to The Overlap, brought to you by Sky Bet, Onana revealed that’s not accidental, but an intentional space-making ploy designed to invite the opposition onto him.

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Onana said: “Manchester United are a big club, we cannot run behind the ball and hide – we want to have more possession.

“Playing back to me, we try to create space – I have to be clever, fast-thinking and see what the opponent is going to do.

“Sometimes the opponent’s centre-back will jump onto your midfielder or striker. If he doesn’t jump, that means we have plus one [option]. I have to recognise that, and find the free man.

“Sometimes that is the problem, because you have the ball, and you don’t see who is free. It depends on how they press – if they press with 10 or if they press with the winger, it depends.

“Some teams know you’re very good with the fit, or you are a very intelligent player, have good skills or you are fast. So they prepare how to block you, especially in this league.”

Onana made more saves than any other Premier League goalkeeper in 2023/24, and while he also boasted the division’s best save percentage among regular keepers, he hopes to be much less busy next season.

Only rock-bottom Sheffield United allowed more shots on their goal than Manchester United over the campaign, which Onana acknowledges is an issue that needs addressing.

He said: “It’s a price to pay. Everything is temporary – last season they didn’t face that, and I’m 100% sure that next season we will not face that.

“It’s football: I think it’s about moments, and we faced a lot of injury crises, lost a lot of important players – but of course, it’s not an excuse.

“It’s just a bad season for all of us, and we have to stay positive as we are doing at the moment. I know everything will be alright – if not this season, it will be next year.”

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When you play football at a certain level for long enough, certain situations almost leave you in a state of auto-pilot.

Immediately one of these scenarios that spring to mind is when the ball goes out for a throw-in, in your sides’ defensive half, close to corner flag. 

One of the oppositions players, normally some loudmouth in central midfield, will never fail to shout the following words.

‘Let’s box them in lads.’ Every. Single. Time.

But is this actually just something players say because it sounds like the right thing to say (entirely plausible) or a tactical ploy. Let’s take a look at the related tactical concept of pinning to find out.

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What is pinning?

Pinning is about restricting the movement of the opposition players through intelligent positional play and space occupation.

To ‘pin’ a team back in their own half means they won’t be able to progress up the pitch with the ball. This is because the player, or players, in question would risk leaving an opponent in a dangerous position if they altered their own position.

Pinning usually refers to defenders in particular – if they are pinned in their regular position, they will be unable to get forward and support attacks. One or more defenders will be held in their regular spot, unable to help relieve pressure from the opposition. You’ll often see this when managers or coaches instruct the quickest winger at their disposal to go up against the oppositions slowest full-back.

In turn the full-back will normally drop deeper, to ensure they aren’t risking losing a direct footrace. This is a direct attempt from the winger’s team to pin the opposition back and ensure their defensive backline is unable to push up and squeeze the pitch.

If you see a wide player who normally likes to hug the touchline suddenly sitting infield in more of an inside forward position, this is likely due to the result of pinning.

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In addition, the reason why taking a throw-in near the corner close to your own goal can often lead to being ‘pinned in’ is that it offers a chance to throw multiple attacking players close to the opponents goal – with little drawback.

What are the pros and cons of pinning?

There is no doubt pinning can be an extremely effective tactic, particularly against an unbalanced defence. But it can also have some drawbacks.

In the modern game, defenders are still focused on defending (obviously) but are often excellent ball-players who can hurt the opposition when given time and space to pick passes.

Trying to pin players who are comfortable moving forward and keeping possession, is increasingly difficult. Often at the top level, defenders will call the bluff of their opponent when they feel the opposition player trying to pin them. 

That leaves the forward with a difficult choice - 'do I hold my position or track back to try and disrupt them playing?'

A prime example came of this at the top level came when Newcastle United hosted Manchester City in the Premier League midway through the 2023-24 season. In the first half Newcastle went for a man-to-man marking system to match City.

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This tasked speedy winger Anthony Gordon with maintaining a high position on the left in an attempt to pin City’s attacking right-back Kyle Walker. Gordon was able to consistently get Walker racing back towards his own goal, and managed to score directly from a run down from the left channel.

Pep Guardiola was forced to change his system in the second half to respond, pushing Walker further up the pitch, with Gordon now having to track back and mark him to prevent City from getting an overload down the right.

It sums up how effective pinning can be in today’s game. Naturally it can surprise the opposition and force them into tactical tweaks. 

But equally it can often negated by a defender changing their position or outrunning their opponent.

MORE TACTICAL EXPLAINERS

We have several tactical explainers to help you understand more about football.

When it comes to midfields, we have pieces on what a box midfield is, how double-pivot midfields function and explainers on the No.10 and the No.6, as well as attacking and defensive transitions.

We also have explainers on what gegenpressing is, what target men are how inverted full-backs work and what ‘between the lines’ means, along with explainers on overlaps and overloads.

Any experienced defender knows they can only be as strong defensively as the players in front of them. 

At any level of the game you can have the best back four in the league. But if they have no protection or defensive structure in front, you can forget about keeping clean sheets.

Midfielders and attackers can no longer think simply about going forward. In 2024, nearly everyone on the team must be contributing defensively as well. But how do coaches ensure their attacking players will play a role in the defensive structure?

One of the main defensive principles that ensures everyone contributes is known as staggering. But how does it work?

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What is staggering? 

Staggering refers to players occupying different horizontal and vertical lines when they don’t have possession. This adds layers to a defensive structure and makes a team more compact.

At a simple level it is the arrangement of players of a team at different heights and widths on a football pitch. If the pitch is divided into both horizontal and vertical lines, a staggered defensive structure will see players occupy adjacent lines, not the same.

A staggered approach to defending ensures that a team cannot be played through easily. Pockets of space can’t be found easily by the team in possession, meaning they often have to turn backwards to recycle the ball.

Certain formations can tend to lend themselves better to staggered defences than others. For example a 4-2-3-1 in a defensive mid block provides a good, staggered defensive presence that makes a team hard to penetrate. 

MORE TACTICS: How Mikel Arteta Just BROKE Man City's System

Can staggering also refer to attacking play?

Yes, the concept of staggering can also refer to when a team has the ball. A staggered attacking shape will see a side occupy dangerous areas of the pitch, able to easily receive the ball on the half-turn. 

It ensures a player in possession has multiple options for playing the ball and does not simply have to turn back or sidewards to maintain possession. With multiple different connections occupying different lines, players should find it easier to link-up with teammates, or at least that's the theory.

When a team has the ball and doesn’t stagger their attacking shape, they can become very easy to play against. For example, playing with a flat midfield four without staggering their positioning can be detrimental. 

In this scenario the midfield would struggle to find passing options and be easily susceptible to an organised press.

Which uses staggering?

Nearly every well organised side off the ball will use staggering to some degree. Whether employing a high press, mid block or low block, a staggered structure will always be beneficial. 

One side who have improved immeasurably by a greater use of staggering is England under Gareth Southgate. One of the reasons the Three Lions struggled in the semi-final against Croatia back in the 2018 World Cup. 

England deployed a two No.8s, Dele Ali and Jesse Lingard during the tournament, but against Croatia, both players were flat, dropping deep alongside Jordan Henderson. This lack of staggering meant they were unable to energetically press the Croatian midfield of Luka Modric and Marcelo Brozović.

But since then England has rarely been found wanting like that again. Ahead of Euro 2024 with a potential midfield trio of Declan Rice, Jude Bellingham and Kobbie Mainoo, Southgate's side has the mix of agility and game intelligence to stagger their midfield shape both in and out of possession.

Even if, say, Trent Alexander-Arnold comes into that midfield for certain games, he will take up  a deeper position on the outside right, while Bellingham will be occupy his preferred position, high and slightly towards the left of midfield. If the men’s team are finally able to bring home a major trophy in Germany, staggering may well play a crucial part of Southgate’s approach.

More tactical explainers

We have several tactical explainers to help you understand more about football.

When it comes to midfields, we have pieces on what a box midfield is, how double-pivot midfields function and explainers on the No.10 and the No.6, as well as attacking and defensive transitions.

We also have explainers on what gegenpressing is, what target men are how inverted full-backs work and what ‘between the lines’ means, along with explainers on overlaps and overloads.

When Barcelona's high press convincingly beat Manchester United 2-0 in the 2009 Champions League final, the majority of English football fans and the media were stunned.

This was a world-class team, at the very least the final was expected to be close. Then Pep Guardiola offered a post-match assessment that gave some insight into why United had looked so rushed every time they had got on the ball beyond the first 15 minutes. “Without the ball," Guardiola said, “we are a disastrous team, a horrible team, so we need the ball.”

He understood the fundamentals; the quickest way to get the ball – the world of the high press. Let’s take a look at this football term in another FourFourTwo tactical explainer and why it works.

What is the high press?

Put simply, pressing is when the team without the ball is being aggressive in their approach to retrieve the ball from the opposition.

In turn, to execute a high press – or high block – the team structure will be to push up the pitch and get in the opposition half to counter-press win the ball back. Normally a team playing a high press will have their backline on the halfway line or even just inside their opponents half.

In the clip above, the light-blue team play short from a goal kick, only for the claret team's left-winger to cut out a pass and create a chance, which is scored.

An effective high press will leave the opposition struggling to build-up in possession, with errors easily forced: but the high press isn’t as simple as the nearest player from the defensive team charging at the ball. This tactic is defined by a collective and organised attempt to win the ball as high as possible. This means cutting passing lanes and expanding a lot of physical effort.

Doing this in a compact and organised manner is extremely difficult. It is not as simple as telling your team five minutes before they go out, to ‘cover every blade of grass.’ Teams with a high press will also usually set traps to encourage the opposition to play the ball in a specific way, before the team without the ball aggressively close down the space to win the ball back.

It is tricky to organise, yet effective when pulled off. Hence why the majority of the best teams in the world are now employing it.

Who uses the high press?

Ever since that first, treble-winning, season at Barcelona, Guardiola has maintained his status as the most prominent high-pressing coach in the game.

But the vast majority of coaches at the top level are now looking to employ a philosophy built around high pressing, rather than retreating in transition, certainly in matches where they are the favourites – from Simone Inzaghi to Unai Emery, from Eddie Howe to Luciano Spalletti.

Jurgen Klopp’s Liverpool also consistently employ a high press, as part of their wider philosophy around counter-pressing. Many of the great teams in history have utilised a high press tactic, from Arrigo Sacchi’s all-conquering Milan side of the late 1980s to the Ajax team that won a treble of European Cups in the early-70s.

This shows the high press is by no means an innovative modern creation: it actually offers something of a short history of European football tactics. Rinus Michels – ranked at no.2 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest managers ever – led Ajax to the first of those European Cups, and heavily influenced the great Johan Cruyff who then coached Guardiola at Barcelona.

Michels’ heavy pressing and remarkably efficient offside trap ensured Ajax were always capable of winning the ball back extremely quickly, playing football that often seemed lightyears ahead of their opponents.

Equally, the high press has evolved and progressed down the decades, and there is not a one-size-fits-all approach. But the fact that the tactic continues to permeate the modern game, speaks volumes about how effective it is.

What are the pros and cons of a high press?

At its best a well-executed high press can suffocate opponents with the ball. But it does require players to have a high level of tactical understanding and discipline.

Inevitably a high press will leave space in behind the defence and shrewd opposition will look to exploit this with long passes. This is why having a high-quality rest defence can make such a difference for teams employing a high press – and Guardiola’s Manchester City have looked, at times, shambolic without key players.

Without a world-class sweeper keeper in Ederson, City struggled in Guardiola's first season, while following the ACL injury that Rodri picked up in 2024, City lacked the same ferocity out of possession, knowing that the 2024 Ballon d'Or winner wasn't there to clean up second balls, commit tactical fouls and organise from the no.6 position.

Organisation is key, too. It only takes one player missing their cue for the whole high press to be easily by-passed – and top technical defenders have no problem playing around a high-pressing team, even at the highest level.

The horseshoe. Football fans in the UK never cease to baffle continental supporters about what they consider applause-worthy during a game.

A cushioned header back to the goalkeeper when under no pressure? Always well received. And we will often explode with a roar of encouragement when our team wins a corner, regardless of how often they actually result in a goal. One of the other main examples of this is when a midfielder opens his/her body out and switches play to the other side, again when under little pressure from the opposition.

Supporters applaud it, yet it is probably one of the most simple skills any professional player will perform during a game. But how does this pass relate to a team’s tactical set-up with the ball? The answer can be found in what many are now calling the horseshoe matrix – a football term we'll break down in another tactical explainer…

What is the Horseshoe?

Horseshoe is the name given to the shape of a pass map when a team moves the ball around a low block without actually penetrating and breaking the lines.

The name itself is almost self-explanatory. When the attackers are positioned around another team, looking to keep possession, the formation resembles a horseshoe.

In the clip above, the team in sky blue pass the ball around a disciplined low block, waiting for spaces to appear in the opposition.

The phrase is sometimes used negatively – just as tiki-taka was during Spanish football's 2008-12 golden era – as possession for possession's sake, without the killler pass to split a defence. But more positively, the horseshoe keeps the ball moving against a low block, and ensures an attack doesn’t stagnate.

When facing a disciplined and compact opposition, a team will need to shift the ball across the pitch as quickly as possible. This in turn will make the defending team move from side to side to engage the ball. Slowly, the longer the attacking team has the ball, space should, almost naturally, appear.

The aim of this tactic is to wear the defensive team down by keeping the ball moving in dangerous areas. In theory, it should keep teams chasing shadows. A side employing the horseshoe against a low block will always have a spare man to pass to, even if that involves going backwards.

Who uses the Horseshoe? 

The word “horseshoe” has crept into football a lot more since the 2022/23 season – and a title race between two proponents of the tactic. With Mikel Arteta's Arsenal challenging Pep Guardiola's Manchester City, both managers became ever-more dominant in possession and a bigger focus on ball retention in the final third.

City fielded two wide no.10s in Jack Grealish on the left wing and Bernardo Silva on the right, and tasked them with receiving the ball to feet, instead of making incisive runs into the box.

This formed a five-man horseshoe – along with Rodri at no.6 and City's no.8s in the half-spaces – across the five channels of the pitch behind Erling Haaland.

It was Haaland's job to push opposition defences back with his movement off the ball and threats of blindside runs – with essentially five playmakers behind him (including Rodri, as a regista-like no.6) to pick out passes. Haaland netted 34 Premier League goals that season as the Sky Blues won the Treble – but often, the runs that Haaland made were enough to create space for the likes of Kevin De Bruyne and Ilkay Gundogan to dash into the box and finish themselves.

Arteta had a similar idea, if executed a little differently. As Arsenal's technical level improved, they faced a greater number of disciplined, low-blocks than previous – finding themselves recycling the ball around the final third in a horseshoe, keeping the tempo high and often relying on late winners after considerable time sustaining pressure on opponents.

Gabriel Jesus was used in the Gunners' set-up as a false nine, dropping out of the box to help with recycling the ball, with any one of the attackers behind tasked with making runs into the box. That season, Bukayo Saka, Martin Odegaard and Gabriel Martinelli all scored 15 goals.

Arsenal's 2023 3-2 win against Bournemouth became a classic example. That season, Arsenal found a calmness and a patience, even if initially frustrated by a defensive minded opposition.

Against the Cherries, the Gunners kept possession, but also kept the tempo of the game high, using the horseshoe to move the ball quickly and efficiently. Doing this at speed has kept the crowd engaged for home games, with any nervous energy from the stands instead transmitted into backing the team.

What are the cons of using the Horseshoe?

If your team lacks creativity, you can be horseshoeing all day.

Only the best attacks can break down the best defences in most cases. An extremely well-drilled defensive opposition may even encourage their opponent to keep the ball this way, refusing to counter-press or push their team higher, since they can stay comfortable in their deeper shape.

Additionally, the horseshoe requires technically excellent ball-playing defenders – who won't be slouches in transition. In this tactic, the centre-backs will both be up on the halfway line tasked with shifting the ball to the other side as quickly as possible. They will have time on the ball, but often this can actually hinder decision-making when it comes to the next pass.

This is not so much of a disadvantage for Premier League players, but you don’t have to go far down the pyramid to find defenders not capable of manoeuvring the ball quite as effectively.

The half-space is a fated patch of pitch. Can one area of the football pitch be more special than another?

When you’re staring out onto the lush grass at the home stadium of the club you’ve supported your entire life, it probably all feels like hallowed turf. But for the top managers in the game, certain areas of the pitch are indeed special.

So what makes the half-space so mythical? And why does it matter? Here at FourFourTwo, we're here to explain any football term you need a hand with. Let's dive in.

What is the half-space?

To understand the half-space, you must divide the pitch into five vertical lanes running the length of the pitch. The areas closest to the touchline are, naturally, referred to as the wide areas.

The middle of the five lanes, is known as the centre. That leaves the remaining two lanes, in between the centre and the wide areas. Both are the half-space.

In the clip above, the right-sided centre-midfielder picks up the ball from the goalkeeper and carries it into the halfspace.

The term originates from Germany, who have their own term for the two half-spaces, ‘halbraum’.

Typically these areas are considered dangerous in an attacking sense. Broadly the half-spaces are considered to have the in-possession advantages of the centre zone, with the added bonus of greater space for movement.

Yet they also offer an angle that encourages unpredictable passes, harder to read for opposition defenders. Managers including Jurgen Klopp, Ralph Hasenhuttl, Pep Guardiola and Thomas Tuchel are all known to focus on exploiting the half-space.

Who's so special about the halfspaces?

Well… angles. And it all depends on what's happening around you.

The half-space is the area of the pitch between the centre-back and full-back – so that's a good place to pick out a pass in the channel between the pair of them. If you're a right-footed playmaker in the right half-space like Kevin De Bruyne or Trent Alexander-Arnold, crosses from this position cause confusion between two centre-backs. If you're right-footed and in the left half-space, you can cut onto your favoured foot and have the whole goal to aim for.

The central space is too congested. The wide spaces are too far from goal. The halfspaces, meanwhile, offer passing options left and right, a clear sight at goal and uncertainty in an opposition defence. These areas are the courts of kings and queens who play quickly and instinctively, whatever the scenario.

Which players use the half-space effectively?

Two of the greatest players in Manchester City’s history are coincidentally two of the greatest masters working the half-space: playmakers David Silva and Kevin De Bruyne.

The little Spaniard lived in the half-space. His ability to take the ball fluently on the half-turn from close range meant Silva could push aggressively at the top of the half-space. It was so hard for defenders to get the ball off Silva in this area, he would naturally create plenty of chances when occupying the zone.

His fellow City no.8 De Bruyne is equally perfect for occupying the half-space. The Belgian often sits deeper but uses his wonderful crossing ability to pick out forwards playing on the last shoulder.

Even though he built his reputation as a goalscorer, Harry Kane is another player who intelligently uses the half-space, for linking with midfield and switching play to the opposite flank. Other players notable for utilising the half-space include, Phillip Lahm, Pedro, Guro Reiten and Sadio Mane… but in truth, the list is almost endless.

What are the pros and cons of attacking in the half-space?

The main benefit of the half-space is the options available to a person in possession. Forwards could be running in behind, with perhaps a full-back wide on the overlap.

A player will be encouraged to play dangerous diagonal passes which are far harder to defend against. Central players will naturally be drawn towards the ball leaving space on their blindside that can be exploited. The central and wide areas are often more crowded, meaning it can be harder to find a killer forward pass in these zones.

A downside is that you really need players with excellent split-second decision-making to make the most of the half-space.

Think about it this way. If you are carrying ball forward in the centre or wide lanes within the final third, you’ll often not even need to think about the best course of action. Often you’ll shoot in the centre or cross in the wide areas.

But the half-space requires more than instinct. It is not always easy to shoot from this space, but also not always clear when a pass or dribble is required.

Unless of course you’re David Silva, in which case you’ve already made the right decision.

The free man or spare man is a simple concept. And as the great Bill Shankly once said, “Football is a simple game complicated by idiots.”

Boiled down to its basic components, to be successful in football you have to, A) have the ball, and B) use it effectively. For any team, the best way to make the most of the time of their time on the ball is to work the space. To have space on the football pitch, is to have power.

This is why finding, and using, the spare man is essential for every team that has played the game. Here’s your tactical explainer, as we explore another of the big football terms you need in your toolbox.

 What is the spare man?

The spare man, or free man, is simply to have a player in possession who “free” to receive a pass, away from a cluster of players elsewhere.

Having a spare man is to have a numerical advantage when in possession. This is why so many in-possession philosophies feature creating passing triangles, or other similar patterns of play.

In the clip above, the blue team's left-back makes a marauding run forward and is the spare man to finish off a move from the team's right-winger.

By having a spare or ‘free’ player in possession, it is far easier to keep hold of the ball, while simultaneously creating space elsewhere on the pitch. The use of the spare man can also extend to a third-man run, a method of finding a teammate in a better position than those on the ball.

This occurs when two players exchange passes, with a third teammate then making an off-the-ball run into space to receive a pass. Again this is primarily to create a numerical advantage and maintain possession.

Whether making a blindside run, or moving towards the ball to create a triangle, the key with the spare player is creating an angle to receive the ball. Always offering, always showing for a team-mate. This allows the team in possession to not only maintain it, but penetrate the opposition as well.

Which coaches use the spare man?

Gian Piero Gasperini’s Atalanta side are a perfect current example of a team that focuses on creating overloads with a spare man.

In the first phase of their build-up play, Atalanta use a back three in possession, attempting to play through the oppositions initial press. As they continue to move the ball up the pitch, Gasperini’s team look to create triangles in possession to ensure the normally always have numerical superiority.

Midfielders and forwards will often rotate to ensure the spare man is present. Such a fluent style of play often unsettles the opposition defence, who are torn between tracking runners to ensure their teammates don’t get overloaded, or staying put.

But doing the former can subsequently leave large gaps of space for Atalanta to exploit. 

Arsene Wenger's Arsenal were always heavily focused on finding the spare man – dubbed ‘Wengerball’ – while Maurizio Sarri’s teams at Napoli, Chelsea and more recently Lazio have also focused heavily on trying to create a spare man in possession. Sarri’s fairly rigid 4-3-3 system with a regista at the base of his midfield is designed to create diamonds and triangles throughout the pitch, giving his team the spare man.

Sarri is also keen on third-man runs from his team. Regularly you will see his team create inverted triangles in the opposition half, with two passing options for the player in possession.

Once the player has made his choice of where to pass, the non-receiver will sprint in behind the opposition defence. But remember: a simple game overcomplicated by idiots. Nearly every team focused on dominating possession is looking for the spare man in one form or another. 

Some coaches just make it more obvious than others.

Oh, the trusty cover shadow. There was a time in football where being caught between going for the ball or holding your ground was something of a cardinal sin.

If you were man-marking, man mark. If you need to close the ball down, do so. Tracking, marking and tackling were the cornerstones of good defending. But that has changed. Thanks primarily to the cover shadow.

But what is the cover shadow? Here’s your tactical explainer, as FourFourTwo breaks down yet another football term for your lexicon. Let's delve in.

What is the cover shadow?

When a player, out of possession, positions himself between an opponent on the ball and a player open for the pass, he's covering that open player with his shadow.

You're halfway there already. The cover shadow is a pressing mechanism that gives teams a guide on how to win the ball back when out of possession.

In the clip above, the green team are trying to play out from the back: the goalkeeper moves the ball to a centre-back, only for the navy-blue midfielder to jump and press: he's approaching the green defender, with a green midfielder in his cover shadow, leaving little option to play between the lines. With the navy-blue team smothering the green team's right-hand side and the green centre-back backed into a corner where he can only play the ball back to source, the keeper is pressured into clearing for a throw-in.

Having the pressing player in the cover shadow, means they are not moving towards the ball or man-marking a potential receiver. Instead, the aim is to mark the space between the two opposition players.

This allows the defending team to organise themselves strategically. If using cover shadows smartly, the team without the ball can end up forcing the side with the ball to funnel passes backwards, retaining possession but losing penetration.

The defending player will be restricting the opportunity for the open player to receive the ball and thus prevents the pass. It is a less aggressive way of defending, compared with pressing the ball carrier at maximum speed for instance. But using cover shadows often proves highly effective.

Who uses the cover shadow?

With man-to-man marking a less common practice at the top level of football, (although it does still happen occasionally) nearly every team will use the cover space. But still some use it more regularly than others.

One of the best examples from across Europe is Declan Rice. Since joining Arsenal, Rice has shown the world what West Ham fans knew for a long time: he is far more than just a tough-tackling no.6.

The England and Gunners star doesn’t simply regain possession through tackles. Instead, he is a master of using the cover shadow to cut passing lanes and make interceptions. Rice is also pretty handy on the ball himself and has at times been deployed further up the pitch in a no.8 role, pressing high up the pitch.

However, Rice and his fellow Arsenal midfielders were given a taste of their own medicine in a Champions League defeat at Porto in early 2024, with the former European champions using cover shadows to perfection when in their defensive shape.

Porto forwards Wenderson Galeno and Evanilson allowed Arsenal centre-backs to have the ball, but then tucked inside to mark the space between the defenders and Gunners’ playmaker Jorginho. They also made sure they always had players in front of Rice and Martin Odegaard to stop Arsenal building tempo through the middle of the pitch.

It led to a slow, jerky contest devoid of any fluency. Thankfully for Arsenal fans, the Gunners eventually put things right in the second leg after losing 1-0 in Portugal.

What are the pros and cons of the cover shadow?

The main issue with trying to close space and prevent passes with this tactic, is that you don’t know where the opposition are behind you. Even if utilising the cover shadow, the defending player still has to face the ball.

This means a team with clever movement in the next third of the pitch will still be able to find space for their defenders to find them between the lines. There is a risk that should the on-the-ball team position themselves well enough and give themselves optimum passing angles, they'll be able to play around the press – even if opponents are tracking two players.

Oh, and any tactic in which one marker has to jump between two markers is risky. You've played piggy-in-the-middle, right? Midfielders jumping to mark higher up creates a chain in which defenders are jumping, too – and any team with a long ball and a target man can beat a press like that.

In addition, like with any defensive tactic, there is zero use in one player deploying it on their own. Your positioning is often only as good as your teammates’ positioning around you: so constant communication is required. As defensive players, we almost need eyes in the back of our heads at times.

For the majority of the time, sadly, this is literally impossible. But that is why you need helpful instructions from teammates who can see a player who has run in behind you. The cover shadow is a smart way of cutting off passes: but it requires every player of the team without the ball to work in tandem.

Ahh, the low block. Making yourself hard to play against is one of the fundamentals to football coaching. You can have a team full of talented, technically excellent, footballers, but if you also have a soft underbelly, don’t expect results over a long hard season.

At times football is often talked about like a chess match, particularly when it comes to the tactical battle, and as we all know rule one of chess (probably) is to think, “which move would make things most uncomfortable for my opponent right now?” Then do it.

This is often where the decision to employ a low block comes from – so fancy a tactical explainer? FourFourTwo has the breakdown for every single football term you'll need – and this one is a particularly common one in English football.

What is the low block?

A low block occurs when a team holds a deep narrow defensive line out of possession. They will have their defenders close to their own goal, to deny the opposition space to run in-behind the backline.

The midfield and attack will also be within, or close to, their own half with minimal space between each unit, with the priority to protect their deep-lying defensive line. Space in the opponents half is conceded.

In the clip above, the team in black are camped in a low block, while the team in sky-blue are trying to find a way to break them down.

There is also an expectation on the centre-backs, whether playing two or a three, not to be passive and simply sit back. They must show controlled aggression and aim to dominate the space in front of them, not allowing the opposition to pass their way through the block and break the lines with ease.

A team employing the low block won’t be expected to have the majority of possession over 90 minutes, but this does not mean it is an ineffective tactic, far from it.

If a team can do this while remaining ‘compact’ they can become very difficult for the opposition to break down, restricting the number of chances in a game. It is a set-up best employed for a match where you know the opposition might have more individually talented players, but suspect they might lack cohesion and creativeness.

Who successfully uses the low block?

At the top level of European football, few have mastered the tactic quite like Diego Simeone. The longstanding Atletico manager has successfully used a low block throughout his 13 years at the club.

Simeone regularly employs a narrow 4-4-2 system, or at times a 5-4-1, with his out-of-possession structure designed entirely to deny the opposition space inside. The Argentine’s team are particularly adept at defending aggressively when the ball comes into their penalty area.

This forces the opposition to try and play through the middle, rather than rely on an overload of crosses from full-backs or wide players. However, getting through the middle of such a well-drilled narrow side is often something of an impossible task.

Jose Mourinho, meanwhile – ranked at no.12 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest managers ever – employed a low block masterfully when guiding Inter Milan to a historic treble in the 2009/10 season. In the return legs of all three Champions League knockout ties that year, the Italians' incredibly organised low block, produced some of the greatest defensive performances you could wish to see. The most famous came against Barcelona in the semi-final when Inter played well over an hour with ten men and still went through.

For defenders like Lucio, Marco Materazzi, Walter Samuel and Christian Chivu the low block suited them down to the ground. Inter's defensive record in the Coppa Italia that season spoke volumes – five games played, four clean sheets and just one goal conceded as they won the cup.

Mourinho continued to use the low block when in his second spell at Chelsea, Manchester United and also at times during his short reign at Tottenham with mixed success. But the Special One has varied his approach throughout his career. His Porto side that also became European Champions, normally did the opposite, with an advanced defensive high line and pressing from the front.

Antonio Conte is the most recent manager to win the Premier League title partly by employing a low block. His 2016/17 Chelsea side became champions while conceding just 33 goals in 38 games, or more impressively, 24 goals in 32 games when setting aside the first six games of that season.

The same division always provides tactical variety often through teams using low blocks. For years Tony Pulis turned Stoke City, and by definition the Britannia Stadium, into a fortress constructed on the foundations of a rock-solid low block.

Pulis later employed a similar style at Crystal Palace to keep them up in 2013/14. For all the wider noise surrounding his teams on physicality and set pieces, most importantly of all, they knew how to defend. Sean Dyche and Roy Hodgson have utilised a similar approach in recent years at Burnley and Crystal Palace respectively.

What are the pros and cons of a low block?

If able to consistently deny the opposition space, the low block can prove hugely effective. When you have an advantage or lead to protect and the primary aim is to keep things tight at the back, the pros usually outweigh the cons.

But it can make it harder to create chances of your own. By conceding such huge swathes of territory, getting the ball up the other end is, naturally, going to be a tough ask.

You need players capable of transitioning at lightning speed, whilst also knowing how best to use space while carrying the ball. Individuals who have enough energy to quickly get their defensive shape back once they have lost the ball is another essential.

The system also requires good communication between teammates and concentration over 90 minutes. Playing a low block requires discipline. Setting up the team in this manner without being disciplined, is almost akin to immediately throwing in the towel.

Ruben Amorim's style of play has taken Portugal by storm since he became Sporting manager four years ago - convincing Liverpool to bring him to Anfield in the summer.

With reports suggesting that Amorim has agreed a three-year deal with Liverpool to replace Jurgen Klopp once he leaves, plenty of Reds supporters have been left excited about what they can expect from the Portuguese boss.

But what is Ruben Amorim's style of play and tactics that Liverpool fans will see in the Premier League next season? FourFourTwo delves deeper into the analysis of his teams below. 

Ruben Amorim's style of play and tactics

The first thing to note about Ruben Amorim is his clear preference for a 3-4-3 formation - something that, on paper, Liverpool have never really used under Jurgen Klopp since he took over in October 2015. At Sporting, Amorim has adapted the formation in such a way that every single player knows their job while on the pitch, and it's likely that he will stick with the setup in the Premier League. 

In possession from a goal kick, Sporting typically create a diamond with the back three and goalkeeper, allowing the two midfielders to push slightly higher and wider on the pitch. The central defender - usually former Liverpool defender Sebastian Coates - operates at the tip of that diamond, acting as an option to bounce angled passes through from either his goalkeeper or centre-back partners. Virgil Van Dijk would likely perform this role at Liverpool, having already become experienced with the role for the Netherlands national team.

With the two central midfielders slightly higher and wider than Coates, passing lanes are therefore created for the wider centre-backs to play through directly towards the forward three. Turning a high-press opposition in this way often creates plenty of chances, and is perfect in playing to Liverpool's strengths of directness and quick play. 

The two wing-backs, meanwhile, hug the touchline at all times during the game, supporting attacks by staying as high and wide as possible. With the centre forward (Victor Gyokeres) doing the same to the opposition centre-backs, this allows the other two forwards in the line up to drop into dangerous half-spaces, as well as make runs into the space the No.9 has created.

Gil Vicente head coach, Vitor Campelos, highlights Amorim's preference for his forwards.

"He likes to have technical players in the forward line with the two wingers, Edwards and Pedro Goncalves," Campelos told Sky Sports. "Edwards is having a good season. But the biggest surprise here is the striker who was in England [Gyokeres]. He is an amazing player. He is strong and he is fast."

When higher up the pitch, Amorim enjoys one of his central midfielders sitting slightly deeper than the other, acting as a pivot to bounce passes off and set the tempo of the game. Morten Hjulmand performs that role currently at Sporting, while Hidemasa Morita acts as a more box-to-box option for the team. 

Sporting's structure also enables them to play direct across the pitch. With the centre forward surrounded by team-mates, longer balls are often dropped into Gyokeres, who lays passes off to the other forwards around him, while switches of play are extremely common due to the high and wide wing-backs.

So, while Liverpool might not necessarily be adept at playing a 3-4-3 formation right now, they certainly have the players to perform their roles at an extremely high standard.

What Liverpool might look like under Amorim

With Van Dijk likely to play in the centre of defence, Joe Gomez and Ibrahima Konate are both sound options to sit either side of him. Amorim might look to bring in a left-footed player for one of the positions, though, in order to break lines that bit easier. 

Alexander-Arnold and Robertson, meanwhile, could both play as marauding wing-backs, with Alexis Mac Allister and Dominik Szoboszlai fitting the roles of Hjulmand and Morita perfectly. Up top, Darwin Nunez or Cody Gakpo playing up against the centre-backs will help create space for Mohamed Salah and either Luis Diaz or Diogo Jota to play slightly more in-field and create problems there. 

How Amorim likes to defend

Defensively, Amorim wants his side to be intense and ready to pounce during transitions - straight from the Jurgen Klopp handbook, one may argue. 

The 3-4-3 becomes more of a 5-2-3 out of possession, with the inside forwards briefed to press the two centre-backs while the striker drops slightly to mark one of the midfielders dropping in to receive the ball. That allows the wing-backs to take control of the opposition full-backs, with the right- and left-centre-backs creating a high, albeit risky, defensive line that aims to suffocate the opposition.

At the centre of Amorim's thinking, however, is his prioritisation of protecting the centre of the pitch. Arguably the most intense pressing side in Portugal, Sporting's front three narrow to ensure there aren't any gaps to play through, instead forcing the other team to go wide and attempt to progress that way.

"His team is really organised and fights a lot,"Estoril head coach, Vasco Seabra, also told Sky Sports. "He is always trying to improve his players too. He works with young talent but also with experienced players as well and what they all have in common is that they fight. They are really intense."

That's not to say Ruben Amorim isn't adaptable, though, with the 39-year-old still changing tactics dependent on the opposition. 

"Ruben has a tactical flexibility. He bases it on the opponent, particularly in Europe. He always considers the weaknesses of the opponent," former Valenciennes assistant manager Joao Nuno Fonseca told Sky Sports. 

"He plays a high defensive line most of the time and is good on transitions. It is still a positive game idea based around ball possession. This arrogance in the playing style is very positive for young players because they have this no-fear mentality. That is key."

So, not quite Klopp's heavy metal football - but a style of play that is set to endear Amorim to the Anfield faithful.

More Ruben Amorim stories

Who is Ruben Amorim? Everything you need to know about the new Liverpool manager.

Pinpointing where the false nine originated is a tricky task. Some trace it back to as early as the 1890s, others believe the tactic was used by Hungary’s Golden Team team of the 1950s.

Most started to hear it more often after Pep Guardiola deployed Lionel Messi in the role, when the Argentine was at the peak of his powers. It is also one of the most misused football terms of the 21st century. So exactly what is a false nine and what are the benefits of fielding one?

Let's help. At FourFourTwo, we've been at the forefront of the game for over 30 years – so we've seen a thing or two from forwards dropping away from their positions up front.

What is a false nine?

If a no.9 is something of a ‘true’ centre forward, a false nine is the opposite. Rather than occupy the opposition backline in the manner of a traditional striker, the false nine will move towards the ball in deeper positions from a higher starting position.

They don’t look to run in behind the defence as much, instead wanting to drop so deep almost to become an additional midfielder. Those performing the role need to be experts at timing runs away from the defenders to receive the ball and create midfield overloads.

In the clip above, the false nine from the dark-red team drops out of the centre-forward position to link up with the midfield… creating space for the right-winger to get in behind and score.

They are deployed more with creating openings for others to run the channels, rather than scoring themselves.

The problem for the opposition centre-backs is knowing when to follow the false nine, or let them drop deep. This means the false nine can cause huge problems if they time their movement to perfection.

Playing on the half-turn is essential – it also doesn’t mean they can’t still remain a goalscoring threat. Without the ball, the false nine will still occupy the same position a traditional centre forward would. As the highest central player, they will still be required to screen passes from the centre-backs and instigate a press when necessary.

Who are the great false nines?

As mentioned, Guardiola’s use of Lionel Messi during the Catalan’s tenure at Barcelona is probably the most famous example. Ranked at no.1 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest players of all time, Messi possessed two particular qualities that allowed him to flourish in this role.

Few players in history were better at receiving the ball on the half-turn. In addition, Messi’s expert positioning in a Barcelona team that always dominated possession, meant he was able to pick up the ball between the lines.

In general, the majority of false nines were picked to play that position because of clever movement and expert passing ability. But what made Messi different was his ability to suddenly dribble at the opposition backline with ferocious speed, whenever the situation required.

In the Premier League, two of Messi’s Argentine teammates were also intelligent enough to play the false nine to great effect. Carlos Tevez at times played the role perfectly in Manchester United’s formidable 2007-09 team.

And while he has spent the majority of his career as an advanced forward, Sergio Aguero played as a false nine in Manchester City’s title-winning 2013/14 side, often slotting in behind Edin Dzeko or Alvaro Negredo. However, Aguero was such an intelligent player he would often change roles at will, doing whatever the game demanded to help his City team. Likewise, Harry Kane has also performed a similar role for England and Tottenham, particularly when Jose Mourinho was in charge at Spurs.

In Jurgen Klopp's gegenpressing Liverpool team, Roberto Firmino was a typical false nine on the ball – and he led a high press with Sadio Mane and Mohamed Salah, while Kai Havertz has played in a kind of hybrid squad role at Arsenal, combining the attributes of a ball-winning no.8, the aerial thread of a target man and the positional freedom of a false nine.

But the term has also been previously used in error amongst the wider football public. This can be traced back to Cesc Fabregas’ deployment as a false nine during Spain’s ultimately successful Euro 2012 campaign.

As Fabregas was predominantly a central midfielder throughout his football career, many took the term just to mean an unorthodox centre forward. Essentially, if a player was playing out of position as a forward, they could be termed as a false nine.

This is incorrect. Yet, somewhat irritatingly, the term was misused to describe anyone playing as a makeshift striker. So often when a big centre-half gets sent to play up front they are labelled as a false nine, even if they are in fact playing as a ‘true nine.’

What are the pros and cons to playing with a false nine?

Creating uncertainty in the opposition defence is undoubtedly the major plus point of this system. If a team has multiple attackers who possess intelligent movement, the false nine can wreak havoc.

But for it to be truly effective, your team has to dominate possession. This is why you’ll see Guardiola often deploy a false nine, at least before Erling Haaland came along.

If the team playing with a false nine isn’t dictating the rhythm of the game, any threat the player may cause is severely nullified. When that happens, the opposition defence can simply let the false nine drift away, without worrying about closing them down. After all, they can’t score from the halfway line.

There are defenders, too, who prefer playing against a false nine, since it's easier for some to defend the space than it is to face a physical threat – and we've all seen teams with false nines crossing into a box with no attackers there to meet the tap-in. So while the role can give your team unpredictability, you have to be clever… otherwise, it becomes rather too predictable not to have a proper presence in attack.

Numerical superiority is key for all teams. We’ve all watched or played football when you can feel one of the two sides has run out of gas.

Inevitably, that team ends up without the ball, dejected and hopeless: chasing shadows. Like a boxer on the ropes or being match point down in tennis, this is the point from where few return. But how can some teams often run others into the ground like this?

The answer may lie somewhere in the theory of numerical superiority, which we at FourFourTwo can explain to you. Here’s your rundown on a key battleground of modern football and a football term that pops up every weekend.

What is numerical superiority?

Numerical superiority is the term used when a team has an overload in one area of the pitch.

For example, if team A had possession down the left flank with three players in close proximity, and team B only had two players in that area trying to regain the ball, team A would have numerical superiority.

In the clip above, the team in orange manufacture a move in which the left-back, left-winger, left-sided central midfielder and centre-forward create an overload on the left flank – giving them numerical superiority over the opposition.

Essentially, it means one team has an advantage over the other purely down to numbers in one area of the pitch. This is as opposed to qualitative superiority, which is when a player considered superior to their individual opponent isolates them in a one-on-one situation.

A team could also gain superiority through positional play. Positional superiority over their opposition involves getting players into positions between the lines or behind their defensive lines. 

If a team can achieve all of these advantages consistently throughout a match, goalscoring opportunities are almost certain.

Which teams use numerical superiority to their advantage?

Pretty much every side that plays a possession-oriented game will be looking to achieve numerical superiority in one area of the pitch or another, whether they use a false nine to link with the midfield or the no.10 drops into similar spaces to a no.8. Otherwise, you can end up with possession without any real purpose and struggle to break down a compact and well-organised low block.

If you watch the best possession-based teams closely, they will nearly always look to be targeting one specific area of the pitch. The key is finding that numerical superiority where the opposition may have a perceived weakness – or leaving space elsewhere for a spare man to exploit.

It is not always easy to achieve. But like so many other things in football, and life, Pep Guardiola makes it look easy. His Manchester City side are constantly able to find numerical superiority against their opponents.

They do this from the very first phase of play. The no.6, often Rodri, will drop between the two centre-backs, who move wide to create a triangle. As very few teams go man-to-man against City, this naturally creates an overload.

Pep also introduced the regular use of inverted full-backs to create numerical superiority and a box midfield in the centre of the pitch. One of Guardiola’s successors at Barcelona, Luis Enrique had his Treble-winning team of 2014/15 also become experts in numerical superiority.

In the semi-final win over Bayern Lionel Messi and Neymar often played extremely deep to link with the midfield and outnumber Bayern in the middle of the pitch, helped by superbly energetic performances from full-backs Dani Alves and Jordi Alba, who patrolled the flanks.

Ange Postecoglou’s teams, particularly his Celtic side, have focus edheavily on creating numerical superiority. Like big Ange said himself after his Tottenham team beat Bournemouth early in his tenure, “I’m just copying Pep mate.”

It was firmly tongue-in-cheek. But if there’s one area Postecoglou’s teams do look similar to City, it is their ability to create numerical overloads.

What are pros and cons of numerical superiority?

When you have a team full of excellent technical footballers, it is difficult to see a downside to targeting numerical superiority.

But to be implemented properly, you do need highly intelligent footballers, with a real understanding of positional play and how to alter their approach during the game. At the highest level, not everyone can do this.

There is also the wider issue of having such a disciplined approach to attacking play. Naturally, this narrows the space for creative players to exploit, players instead acting more as pawns in a chess set.

More teams adopting a rigid focus on numerical and positional superiority perhaps results in less room for individual flair players who like to drift around the pitch.

The regista. Every coach worth their salt these days knows just how important defensive midfielders are.

Whether coaching an amateur side or simply putting together a flawless tactical system on Football Manager, imposing a deeper midfielder can provide the heartbeat of a team. It’s a position that deserves respect. Just look at how important Rodri has been for Pep Guardiola’s treble-winning Manchester City side in the last few years.

But defensive midfielders are (can represent) very much a broad spectrum. Well, with FourFourTwo's expert help, let's break down the regista – a football term that's been around for decades and still has relevance in 2026.

What is the regista?

Just like ‘trequartista’, the regista is a specialist term derived from Italian. Meaning ‘director’, a regista is a kind of no.6 sits in front of the defensive line.

Unlike many other defensive midfield roles, the regista is primarily a creative player. They will want to get on the ball at every opportunity and, at least in practice, should have more touches of the ball than anyone else on their team.

In the clip above, the highlighted regista is the deep-lying playmaker for the team, dictating tempo and being the creative fulcrum for the team ahead of the centre-backs.

The distribution and passing range of the regista are fundamental to the way their team builds up play. A deep-lying playmaker, in essence, the regista is often just as focused on playing smart short passes, as 60-yard Hollywood passes. 

But perhaps more important is the mindset and mentality of this player. A regista should be an expert in scanning and movement, have elite decision-making and look to control the game with patience and composure. It's no coincidence that this is a role that suits older players, with no.8s and no.10s like Toni Kroos or Paul Scholes receding deeper into the midfield with age to dictate from deep.

As such, the regista role is a more static presence who sits in the no.6 position and waits to receive the ball – though it is possible to pair a regista in a double-pivot.

Who are the great registas?

Where else to start but with Andrea Pirlo. Many would argue he is the purest regista in the modern game. The Italian maestro is certainly one of the best.

Redeployed by Carlo Ancelotti from a more advanced presence for an all-conquering Milan side, Pirlo’s coolness under pressure and almost ridiculous passing range between the lines made him the ideal midfielder to build a possession-based team around in a diamond midfield. Even when he became less mobile later in his career, his performances for Italy at Euro 2012, in knockout stage victories over England and Germany, are as a good a few hours of midfield dominance as you’re likely to see.

In the current game, the likes of Jorginho, Mateo Kovacic and Ryan Gravenberch are all strong examples of how important registas are for top sides. For teams who often come up against a low block – and the top teams in the Premier League often do – having a regista who can make the right decision in possession, and is also comfortable pushing up at short notice, is hugely important.

Julian Weigl was an excellent regista at Borussia Dortmund, while another example would be Paul Scholes’ late-career resurgence at Manchester United from 2008-13. Although, like Pirlo, an advanced midfielder in his younger days, even at times playing as a shadow striker, Scholes reinvented himself as a regista to great effect.

His pinpoint passing and incredible vision from this ‘quarterback’ role were hugely important to United breaking down compact opponents and winning titles in 2011 and 2013.

What are the pros and cons to using a Regista?

Who wouldn't want a tempo-setting midfielder dead in the centre of the pitch, able to read the game perfectly and control it for your team?

Pep Guardiola was a major advocate of a regista at Barcelona, using Sergio Busquets as his no.6. But when he arrived at Bayern Munich, he found the role was somewhat redundant with the players at his disposal.

With Manuel Neuer, he had arguably the best ball-playing goalkeeper of all time, behind the likes of Philipp Lahm, Jerome Boateng and David Alaba, who were all technically blessed defenders. Instead of using a regista to dictate attacks, Guardiola would overload his buildup with these pass masters, bait the famously aggressive Bundesliga pressers and play through opponents with ease, transitioning up the pitch. He even dropped Xabi Alonso in the backline.

In the modern game, football is moving away from specialism. These days, for example, it's expected that your centre-forward can hold up play like a target man and drift into space like a false nine. The raumdeuter did one thing incredibly well, which the average wide man can do as a fraction of their job, while even full-backs are expected to be equally comfortable defending, in possession and overlapping.

To have a cerebral midfielder who isn't tasked with physical work is a luxury these days. The tasks that a regista takes on have been absorbed by defenders, other midfielders and even inverted full-backs – and anyway, not every team needs a regista and not every team ever has. Registas are integral for teams that dominate: but the vast majority of teams don't dominate. Even a manager like Jurgen Klopp at Liverpool preferred to play without one.

At their best, however, registas will utilise space and pull the opposition out of their defensive structure. When you find a good one, they are hard to leave out.

Ah, the trequartista. Just the very mention of the word evokes images of terracotta rooftops and the smell of freshly baked ciabatta.

So, as you can probably guess, a position on the football field born from a literal Italian translation encompasses all that style, glamour and luxury. But what exact role do they take up on the pitch and how do they influence football matches?

Let’s take a look: the experts here at FourFourTwo are here to break down another football term into its most basic state, as we give you a tactical explainer on the trequartista.

What is the trequartista?

In Italian, trequartista means ‘three-quarters’ – and that gives a clue in terms of where they will generally pop up on the pitch.

Imagine splitting a pitch into four sections. A trequartista aims to pick up the ball in the third quarter, roaming around to find pockets of space, creating overloads and confusion in those pressing them.

The clip above highlights the no.10 – where a trequartista plays – in a 4-2-3-1.

This is what distinguishes a trequartista from other no.10s: the freedom to roam. The Argentine role of the enganche is similar but is more of a fixed focal point, while a shadow striker is a less creative player who slots behind a no.9 and looks to make late runs into the box.

The trequartista is defined by its work off the ball, too. They are something of a luxury player and defensive responsibilities are minimal: despite playing closer to a centre-forward than an ordinary no.10 usually would, they don't have the responsibility of pressing high.

Close control, creativity, movement, a high intelligence to read play and excellent link-up play are all staples of the definitive trequartista – who has something of a deal with his coach. Freeing up the player to show their attacking potential, even if it means the team may lose something defensively, is a difficult balance to strike – but one that was customary in Catenaccio-gripped calcio in Italy.

Who are the great trequartistas?

So many of the great creators in football history played this position. It almost feels unfair to only name a handful.

In the modern era, 2007 Ballon d'Or winner Kaka is maybe the last example of a trequartista who was, even if only briefly, the best player in the world. The Brazilian not only had the pre-required exceptional vision and passing ability but combined it with powerful runs forward that immediately put defenders on the back foot.

In general, Milan have always been known for producing greats in the position with Ruud Gullit one of the best to have ever graced football. Gullit had the engine and intelligence to pick the ball up in dangerous areas, while a successor in the role, Rui Costa’s vision in the final third during his peak years as a playmaker was magical.

Perhaps one of the most famous to have played the position, also provides one an interesting trequartista case study. For much of his glittering career at Roma, Francesco Totti lit up the eternal city from the position.

Totti was so influential that Fabio Capello – who pretty much played 4-4-2 for the entire rest of his career – switched to 3-4-1-2 system when he arrived in Rome. With Totti in the hole, behind two mobile strikers he was devastating. And years before Spain were using a false nine at major tournaments, Totti was combining that same role with that of a trequartista in a highly exciting and tactically intriguing Roma side of 2006/07.

The 4-6-0 formation may still have something of a bad reputation in the UK – mainly thanks to Craig Levein’s strikerless Scotland and an infamous 1-0 loss to Czech Republic in 2010 – but Luciano Spalletti employed a variation of that same formation for that Roma team. It was unusual yet brought the best out of Totti.

The Roma talisman was still utilised in his favoured trequartista position. But the team played with no real strikers, Totti the furthest man forward. He would still score goals but also be focused on linking play from deep, playing clever passes behind the opposition defence for Rodrigo Taddei, Simone Perotta and Mancini to run onto.

It was a hugely successful season, Roma finishing 2nd in Serie A and winning Coppa Italia.

What are the pros and cons of a trequartista?

Similarly to the regista – another Italian position with little defensive responsibility – the trequartista can be the heartbeat of a team, giving your side incredible fluidity and creativity.

Like the regista, however, the trequartista is such a specific role, with modern football moving more towards generalists than specialists. Just a no.6 or an inverted full-back is expected to fulfil a regista's remit these days, no.8s are favoured over no.10s by many managers who want compactness and numerical superiority over free-thinking expressionists. A shame? Yes, perhaps – but this is a team game and managers can't always rely on the brilliance of individuals.

In truth, there are few greats currently playing who can be defined solely as trequartistas. The majority of coaches working towards the top of the game can’t, or even don’t want to, find room for such a luxury player.

But there are plenty of great no.10s who incorporate skills and positions used by the great Trequartistas into their own game. All tactical trends fall in and out of fashion in football, and no doubt one day the trequartista will rise again.

What's a channel then? And no, we're talking about TV.

There’s no ‘right’ or ‘correct’ way to win a football match. Although so-called purists might want to tell you differently, every tactic and strategy, whether defensive or attacking, has its own merits and place within our game. So why do so many of us naturally think it is better to have the ball and be on the front foot, as opposed to a more cautious approach?

It might be because there are some areas of the pitch, that even against the best sides, can prove very difficult to defend, no matter how organised you are. This area is the channel – and this is your tactical explainer from FourFourTwo, as we deliver a comprehensive masterclass on every football term you need in your vernacular.

What is the channel?

There two types of channels on the football pitch: vertical and horizontal. Vertical is probably the more well-known of the two, referring to the space in between the full-back and the central defender.

This is the area that an intelligent forward will always look to exploit – often with a blindside run. When playing against a traditional flat back four, the channel can be a potential goldmine.

In the clip above, the dark-red team's right-winger manages to exploit space between the white team's left-back and left-sided centre-back.

In this instance, both centre-back and full-back won’t know who should be picking up the opposition forward when drifting into that zone. It becomes a grey area, often leading to pointing and arguing when a goal is subsequently conceded.

There are also the horizontal channels, the lines that sit between the teams defence and midfield. As a general rule, these channels tend to be exploited more by a team who has an overload in midfield.

When it comes to horizontal channels, however, it's more often referred to as “getting between the lines”.

Which teams exploit the channel well?

Taking advantage of this space and hitting the ball into that ‘corridor of uncertainty’ links pretty much every team that plays a direct style of football, regardless of their formation or wider tactical set-up.

In particular, the great teams from down the years who had success employing a flexible 4-4-2 system often used this tactic. The formation may be seen as out of fashion when it comes to the modern game, but if you have hard-working wide midfielders and agile forwards, hitting the channel with a long ball can work a treat.

Manchester United’s 1999 Treble winners were a prime example. David Beckham and Ryan Giggs weren’t simply flying wingers looking to get to the byline: both were wide players who could step inside and play pinpoint passes down the channel. When you combine this with forwards who possessed the movement and game intelligence of a Dwight Yorke or Teddy Sheringham this was a lethal combination.

Two of United’s most famous goals that season came from exploiting space down the channel albeit, from their other two strikers in that talented frontline. Ole Gunnar Solskjaer’s late strike against Liverpool in the FA Cup third round and Andy Cole’s winner on the final day of the Premier League against Tottenham.

What are the pros and cons of exploiting the channel?

The channel isn’t just for teams that play direct football. Good possession-based sides will also look to take advantage of this area when playing against a deep low block, rather than send aimless crosses into the box.

One disadvantage emerging is related to the improved versatility of the best centre-backs in the world. At the top level, they are normally incredibly athletic and over 6ft 2in.

Generally, these defenders are far less vulnerable to chasing a tricky forward into the channel: go back a generation and most centre-halves, we were told, didn’t want to be turned towards their own goal and certainly don’t want to be chasing after forwards in wide areas. Fast forward to today and you have someone like Virgil Van Dijk: a player who would relish a one-on-one duel against anyone, anywhere on the pitch, at any time.

To an extent, attacking teams will always look to play down the channel, given that it is just such an effective tactic. Stylistically, football in 2024 may look very different to the game played 50 years ago – but this part of the pitch remains vital and probably will do in another 50 years.

What is the blindside in football? Well, let's just say that not being aware of your blind spots always causes issues.

If it happens when you’re behind the wheel, it normally leads to a failed driving test. And an even bigger problem (at least we think so) is when defenders are caught on their blindside by a pacey centre-forward. But it happens every week at every level of football you could possibly imagine.

This is your tactical masterclass in what it is and how useful is it as an attacking tactic. Here at FourFourTwo, we've got the breakdown on every single football term that you might need explained to you – starting with a staple of every team on the planet.

What is the blindside?

If an attacker is making blindside run, they are moving while their opposing defender is looking at the ball.

If timed well it should put the maximum space possible between the player making the run and the player supposed to be staying close to them.

In the clip above, the yellow team's striker makes a blindside run behind a purple defender, to score a goal.

When the opposition has possession, defenders are often taught to position themselves ‘side on’, rather than facing the ball flat. This makes sense. It allows for greater balance and makes reacting a short notice far easier than if ‘face on’.

But it does have the drawback of potentially being exploited by the blindside run from a centre forward. No defender can have eyes in the back of his/her head to see where the blindside run is coming from or which space the attacker is looking to exploit.

It isn’t an easy skill. Blindside runs still require the passer of the ball and the player making the run to be in perfect sync.

Who uses blindside runs?

Probably every striker you could wish to watch this weekend will attempt some form of a blindside run at some point, from a target man to a poacher. But let’s look at example of someone who pretty much built a career on the blindside run. The man ranked at no.48 in FourFourTwo's list of the best Premier League players of all time: Jamie Vardy

Particularly in his 2016-2019 peak, the Leicester forward was an absolute master of this of tactic. The use fits well with Vardy’s overall character and career arc. He was something of an underdog when first playing Premier League football for the Foxes, having been playing his trade in the non-league only a few years earlier.

Vardy was also quite possibly underestimated by plenty of the defenders he faced, making them ideal cannon fodder to be fooled by a blindside run. One of his most famous goals during that fairytale Premier League triumph demonstrates how Vardy perfected the art.

For his record-breaking goal, making it 11 consecutive Premier League games on target, against Manchester United in November 2015, Vardy finds space in the channel between Ashley Young and Matteo Darmian before beginning his run.

Darmian is in a decent position, but Vardy catches him blindside, charging into space behind the Italian defender while staying level. Christian Fuchs plays the perfect pass to set Vardy away, with it too late for Darmian to react, Vardy produces a trademark clinical finish. It’s a pure textbook blindside run, leading to one of the most important goals in Vardy's career.

What are the pros and cons of using blindside runs

The benefits are not only limited to simply, creating chances, you can create uncertainty in a defenders head. Anyone who has played at the back will know this is a tough problem to deal with.

If a centre-back is overly concerned about being caught on the blindside, they may overcompensate by choosing to stick closer to the forward, almost man-marking them. But that in turn should create space for other attackers to exploit. Either way, that doubt of the blindside run in a defenders head can cause internal havoc. Anyone who has played centre-back against a forward with blinding pace can testify this.

The blindside run is a nimble weapon for any forward but shouldn’t be overused. The more you do it, the more your opposite number will expect it. The element of surprise and explosiveness is what helped Vardy, Craig Bellamy, Filippo Inzaghi, Michael Owen and so many other forwards down the years who mastered this skill.

Staying compact, eh? “Some analysts are very objective, some are very subjective. But in the first half an hour, he had a point.”

Even when Erik ten Hag was hitting back at Jamie Carragher’s Monday Night Football analysis after a defeat to Fulham, he had to admit the Sky Sports pundit had a point.

Carragher exposed an issue particularly prickly to some coaches, in Manchester United's lack of compactness – but why was it such a problem? Here’s your tactical explainer, as FourFourTwo looks to educate on another football term for your dictionary.

What is compactness or staying compact in football?

In simple terms, to be compact means to deny the opposition space. Whether a coach has set their team up in a mid or low block, for it to be effective, a team must be compact. This means the space between defensive lines must be as tight as possible when out of possession.

This should, in theory, not allow the opposition to play through the lines comfortably and make things awkward for the team with the ball. Keeping the distance short between players is critical.

In the clip above, the team in black are staying compact to prevent the team in sky blue from finding space to pass between the lines.

It also can refer to the width of the defensive line. For example a standard back four in a low block, normally aims to be as narrow as possible, staying compact to force the opposition on the outside of their defence.

When teams are tighter and focused on denying space at the back, it is also much harder for their opponents to work overloads to create chances. It may sound basic, but for a team to become compact through second nature can take hours of work on the training pitch. 

Building strong connections both in defence and midfield are needed for this. Having similar personnel for consecutive seasons can help, but it isn’t easy. In reality, like anything worth doing in life it takes time and practice to master the art of being compact.

Which teams are the best at being compact?

The modern-day masters are Diego Simeone’s Atletico Madrid. If you ever want to teach a team how to be compact, ply them with footage of the 2020/21 La Liga Champions.

Simeone usually has hit team perfectly compact in a deep-lying 4-4-2 system, looking to exploit the counter-attack with pace and agility up front. But Atletico’s defence and midfield are in perfect harmony when it comes to not allowing the opposition any space in front of them.

This often meant the opposition would become over-reliant on crosses into the box to force opportunities. But go back a few years when the aerially dominant Diego Godin and Stefan Savic were marshalling the defence and even the best teams in Europe would have a hard time scoring.

Elsewhere, Jose Mourinho and Rafael Benitez made sure their Chelsea and Liverpool sides of the 2000s were extremely compact and disciplined. When facing either in the latter stages of the Champions League during this period, it felt like coming up against the immovable object.

But at every level of the game, successful teams will always be looking to deny the opposition as much room to play as possible. To lack compactness in defence can undermine the rest of the gameplan.

This the exact reason Ten Hag was so tetchy when Carragher pointed out United’s problem against Fulham. If you’re not relatively compact without the ball, you’re not organised. And if to be not organised is the cardinal sin for any coach.

The playmaker. In the same way every first-class orchestra needs a conductor, every great possession-based football team needs them.

Both roles cannot be entirely taught. They require a certain touch, feel and vision that goes way beyond training manuals. The sort of job that AI will never replace. But what in the modern game is the playmaker’s job, and who are the current maestros of the profession?

FourFourTwo's experts are on hand to dissect this football term. Here’s your tactical explainer.

What is a playmaker?

The playmaker is often shorthand for the no.10. But that's not entirely accurate. The no.10 doesn't have to be a playmaker – though it usually is.

And more to the point, the playmaker can play… anywhere. Kevin De Bruyne is a playmaker from the no.8 position. Andrea Pirlo is a playmaker from the no.6 position as a regista.

In the clip above, the highlighted player is a deep-lying playmaker who sees a lot of the ball, dictates the tempo and ends up making the decisive pass to play in the ball for the assister in this move.

The playmaker looks to control the flow of their team’s play when in possession. High-level vision and perfect passing are vital. Most can be split into two roles: an advanced playmaker – often playing in the no.8, no.10 or trequartista roles – or alternatively, a deep-lying playmaker, who you may find as a no.6 or regista (or in the case of Trent Alexander-Arnold or Oleksandr Zinchenko, an inverted full-back).

The latter will aim to build from deep midfield, keeping possession but also switching the play when required. When we think of decision-making in football, our attention often turns to the final third – whether to pass or shoot. But decision-making is hugely important to every playmaker. Not just when to pass the ball, but who to pass to. This is why ‘scanning’ the play is essential.

Within a split second playmakers often have to analyse five or six teammates’ positions on the pitch, the space they have, what weight of pass they might require. Not an easy task: and to do that at the highest level and make the right decision, requires serious skill.

Who are the great playmakers?

Although he was recognised in another position as a sweeper, Franz Beckenbauer – ranked at no.8 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest players of all time – was one of the first great playmakers.

His passing range and football IQ were virtually unmatched in the late sixties and early seventies. Der Kaiser could ‘run’ a game in the same way that a Zico or a Pirlo would in the generations that followed. These players could pass with such authority, that they would naturally help control possession and transition up the pitch.

But as the years progressed playmaking has evolved, with dribbling now as important as passing. Elegant Frenchman Zinedine Zidane was one of the finest examples, driving through teams and exploiting space with his touch and power. He wasn’t exactly a bad passer, but Zidane was able to make the play by running through midfield, attacking the space and overloading with his power.

Something of a hybrid of advanced and deep-lying playmaker Luka Modric is perhaps the greatest creator of the modern era. Although Modric can play a pinpoint long switch of play when required, his game is more about opening up angles.

The Croatian knows exactly how to entice a press from the opposition and how that can open up space for another teammate. Watch any game he's ever played in and track Modric for five or ten minutes in the game. He's a modern-day master of the role.

What are the pros and cons of using playmakers?

Football is all about balance. The playmaker has no weakness in itself but where you sacrifice some grit for some technicality.

Since the playmaker is often the most mercurial talent on the pitch: it's rare that he can handle himself defensively, too.

Mesut Ozil was criticised in English football for being a luxury player. The German's talents weren't in a cover shadow or gegenpressing – but that's the trade you make. In history, so few magicians have been equally adept off the ball: there's a reason most advanced playmakers are supported by a sturdy double-pivot behind them.

Equally, Spain may have won Euro 2012 but they flattered to deceive for much of the tournament, before eventually putting together a cohesive performance in the final against Italy. Their problem? They fielded a team full of playmakers.

Vincente Del Bosque was overloaded with them and tried to squeeze them all in together. Xavi and Andres Iniesta were joined by Barcelona teammate Sergio Busquets, but he could also hardly leave out Xabi Alonso. Yet using David Silva and then Cesc Fabregas, as a so-called false nine, proved perhaps one too many. Spain kept the ball ridiculously well but lacked incisiveness and a cutting edge. 

Box to box midfielders might just be the most physical players on a pitch.

Have you ever just tried to sprint the actual distance between both penalty areas on a full-size football pitch? Even when swept along by the exhilarating thrill of a counter attack for your amateur team, that inevitably leads nowhere, it can feel an exhausting task.

But why is this kind of player important? FourFourTwo are here to explain why, with this tactical explainer on a common football term.

What is a box to box midfielder?

Going from box to box is the ability to run effectively, between your own team’s penalty area and the opposition’s.

Plenty of midfielders can physically get between both boxes. That isn’t why this skill is so hard to master.

In the clip above, the right-sided no.8 in a 4-3-3 drops back into the first phase to pick up the ball in build-up, before travelling with the ball to the other box.

The difficulty is doing this as a repeated action, in high-tempo matches. As a central midfielder, right in the heart of the action, going box-to-box can be difficult. The box-to-box midfielder is particularly prevalent in either a traditional 4-3-3 or 4-4-2 formation – and they're almost always a no.8 in this system.

In these systems the central midfielders need to cover a lot of ground to ensure their team can be solid defensively but also a threat going forward. It is all about balance.

Players performing this role need to help out defensively, making clearances and tracking opposing midfielders. But they also need to offer something of a goalscoring threat, while progressing the ball and sustaining attacking plays.

Who are the great box to box midfielders?

Let’s be adults and not turn this into another Steven Gerrard vs Frank Lampard debate. But England’s perennial noughties midfielders were brilliant box to box players.

They had a proper engines, could tackle and read the game. Both were also superb long-range strikers of a football, which helped with their general goal threat. The pair could also time a forward run to perfection. However, work they put in off the ball is often criminally underrated.

Going back a generation, Bryan Robson was the undisputed king of box-to-box midfielders in the 1980s and early 90s. Robson had everything you need to dominate a midfield. Stamina, power, strength, passing range.

He was also an expert at running into the box from deep to score – his two goals against France in the 1982 World Cup a textbook example. Robson’s eventual successor at Manchester United, Roy Keane was much more of a box to box midfielder earlier in his career, before he became a dominant defensive midfielder.

From the modern era, Yaya Toure, Arturo Vidal and Paul Pogba are all classic examples of box to box midfielders.

Does the role still exist?

We live in football’s age of increased specialisation when it comes to positions: so naturally there is less room for a balanced central midfielder, capable of doing everything quite well.

There is also the factor of speed. Admittedly this is more of a specific issue to England, but with games in the Premier League played at lightning speed, the stamina levels required to consistently go box to box are punishing.

Considering the Premier League and before it the old Division One gave birth to so many of the greats in this role, this perhaps explains why numbers in this position dwindled. Football teams dominated by technical ability and pace may not have room for an old-school box to box midfielder.

But they do still exist. Joelinton’s redeployment from misfiring forward, to box to box bulldozer was one of the cornerstones of Newcastle United’s revival under Eddie Howe. Douglas Luiz performed a similar role very well for high-flying Aston Villa, while Declan Rice is undoubtedly a box-to-box player for Arsenal. So no: the box to box midfielder is far from a thing of the past… but these days they might be likely to come from Rio rather than Rochdale.

The no.8 shirt is a thing of beauty. The holder has always felt an important part of any team, even when they aren't.

But while some shirt numbers are certainly are more than others, the role of a no.8 has nothing to do with the number on a player's back. After all, Glen Johnson wore the digit at right-back and Ian Wright at centre-forward.

But in a tactical sense, what is the no.8 position and how does it influence matches? FourFourTwo have breakdowns for the biggest tactical insights in the sport, so let’s take a look at this football term.

What is the No.8?

The no.8 is a forward-thinking midfielder, who starts from a deep-lying position. Although the traditional 1-11 shirt numbers are undoubtedly a factor, the best way to describe the no.8 is in a literal sense: halfway between a no.6 and a no.10.

Players in this position don’t occupy advanced roles deep in the opponent's half. Instead, they usually prefer to break forward into that space by running onto passes.

In the clip above, a no.8 picks up the ball from the goalkeeper and runs up the pitch with it.

They will normally operate in central areas, helping connect teams that build possession from the back with their forwards. Generally, the no.8 will play in front of a more defensive midfielder, who provides the team's defensive structure.

In turn, this gives the no.8 license to drive forward and help attack the opponent's penalty area. But they still have defensive responsibilities, such as tracking runs, closing down space and counter-pressing if required.

This is why to be a no.8 amongst the elites of professional football in 2024, you need to be a super athletic and formidable ball carrier.

Who are the great No.8s?

Go through any of the great teams from the last 30 years, you won’t find many that didn’t have a top-class no.8 in their ranks.

There are different kinds, though. Box-to-box midfielders can be classed as no.8s in more transitional teams – though in possession-heavy sides, no.8s are used more as secondary playmakers alongside a no.8, dictating the flow of a game between the lines and creating overloads wherever they're needed in the final third.

For example, you can’t underestimate the impact of Andres Iniesta on Spain and Barcelona’s dominance between 2008-2012. Ranked at no.15 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest players of all time, he fittingly he even wore the no.8 shirt, but it goes deeper.

Supporting a high press, Iniesta was quietly efficient off the ball, zonally covering midfield spaces – mostly in the half-spaces – and ensuring opponents struggled to maintain possession. While when Barcelona won the ball high up the pitch, he was nothing short of a magician when it came to working through tight spaces, but though he wasn't physically imposing, it was crucial Iniesta was a master at winning 50-50 duels, another key component when building the perfect no.8.

Luka Modric is another master of the role, able to control some of the biggest matches in the game almost singlehandedly with his fluent dribbling and intelligent passing.

The evolution of the no.8 – into an 8.5

The evolution of this role has taken a new step in the 2020s. Top clubs in the Premier League including Arsenal and Liverpool have fielded traditional forward players, sitting deeper while tucked into a midfield trio.

Kai Havertz can be used as a false nine and as a target man – and has performed a hybrid midfield role for the Gunners to great effect. When deployed as a no.8, Havertz hasn’t played with a huge amount of defensive responsibility, but given more forward space to attack seems to have brought out the best in him.

For Liverpool, Cody Gakpo was selected in a similar role semi-regularly during the 2023/24 season. With more players from defence, stepping into midfield – yes we’re looking at you Trent Alexander Arnold – there is more emphasis on attack-minded midfielders, who enjoy charging into more advanced positions.

Havertz and Gakpo mix characteristics of traditional poachers and trequartistas, but are doing so from this much deeper position. So perhaps the ‘no.8.5’ is about to become the next in-vogue tactical trend.

But this is all well and good if you coach a team that dominates possession in the majority of matches played. There are downsides. One of the major issues of playing with advanced No.8s is that naturally, they will leave pockets of space behind them.

The better opponents will be able to exploit this on the counter. Like most things in football, and in life, balance is everything… if you play with an 8.5, make sure you field two athletic, defensively responsible midfielders alongside them.

An overlap is one of the simplest, yet hardest to defend against attacking ploys, responsible for some of football’s greatest goals and biggest moments.

If you want to get to the magical land that is ‘in behind’ the opposition's defence, this is usually the quickest way. But what is an overlap and who uses them most effectively in today’s game? 

Time for your lesson on another major football term, courtesy of the FourFourTwo experts. Let's begin…

What is an overlap?

An overlap is when a player runs on the outside a teammate in possession of the ball, going beyond the ball, ideally into open space. 

It is a simple, yet effective, way to get in behind an opponent's defence. Tracking the player and the ball can be difficult, but defending against a well-timed overlap from a spare man is very hard.

In the clip above, the orange team's left-back makes an overlapping run to receive the pass and make the assist for the goal.

As the full-back has evolved over time to become – broadly speaking – a more attacking position, the use of overlapping runs from has increased hugely.

Partly this is a direct knock-on effect of more and more wingers at the top of football playing as inside forwards rather than hugging the touchline. In turn, this has created overloads in the middle of the pitch, giving full-backs more and more space in the wide areas to charge into. 

And with the advent of wide attackers staying very wide – see Pep Guardiola's ideas, from Bayern Munich onward – the advent of the ‘underlap’ has developed. This is where a player runs inside of their team-mate, rather than outside, and is something you may expect from an inverted full-back.

Who has used the overlap effectively?

The modern day full-back/wing-back, simply has to be able to overlap effectively. At the top level, the speed of the game is lightning-quick. The best right-backs and best left-backs in the world all have the ability to make that gut-busting run beyond their winger.

Therefore those in the wide areas have to be on constant alert, when it comes to supporting the attack, even if they start off in defensive positions. 

Brazil’s long-time international pair of Roberto Carlos and Cafu were perhaps the first world-class players in the position, who were primarily attackers. Carlos in particular was infamously used only in midfield at Inter Milan, who refused to trust him at the back. He then moved to Real Madrid to become the best left-back in the world.

By the time of the 2002 World Cup, the two had perfected the art of the overlap at the highest level. With the duo bombing box-to-box as wing-backs, Brazil swept the competition. A front three of Ronaldinho, Ronaldo and Rivaldo, didn’t need much help going forward, but whenever they did Carlos and Cafu were there in support.

Carlos’ long-term successor at international level, Marcelo was another master of the overlap, getting forward in tandem to wreak havoc with Angel Di Maria or Cristiano Ronaldo down the left flank, for the best part of a decade at Real Madrid.

And Gary Neville built such a career on overlapping, he even named a brand after it.

What are the pros and cons of overlapping?

A big advantage of becoming a virtuoso in overlapping is that you’ll have a far greater chance of getting quality crosses into the penalty. The more quality crosses into the box, the higher your chances of scoring goals.

Tracking overlapping runs isn’t easy for the team out of possession. Even if a winger is pulled back into a defensive position to successfully stop an overlap, they won’t immediately help a transition.

There are difficulties of overlapping, however. The runner can’t always be seen by the player in possession – meaning passers need an excellent positional sense of where their teammates are on the field – while a defender steaming forward can compromise your compactness.

Nearly anyone receiving the ball in a wide area needs to overlap, quickly and effectively – but creating that numerical advantage in one area can leave you vulnerable to attacks. These days, hard-running full-backs can be the most susceptible to injury, too, as they're doing the most running in the team.

There is also a danger players can become over-reliant on this skill. Even in the modern game, you have to be a good defender first and foremost. There’s no point in worrying all about your attacking runs, if you don’t have a clue what is going on behind you. The best full-backs in the world today are still excellent defenders, even if they overlap at will.

How to describe what “between the lines” means… ever get that helpless feeling your team is being overrun by the opposition?

We’ve all been there. But what are the lines and how do teams get between them?

Here's your tactical explainer. Here at FourFourTwo, we've got the breakdown on every single football term that you might need explained to you…

What is getting between the lines?

For the purpose of this, the lines refer to a connecting space among a team's defenders, or midfielders, or attackers. In a basic 4-4-2 system, the defensive line would be joined up by the back four.

Of particular importance is getting between the defensive and midfield line. This is the golden area of space, the majority of possession-based teams are seeking.

In the clip above, the yellow team play out from the back to find space between the lines of the purple team.

If a team isn’t particularly direct with their attacking play, exploiting this area is key to reaching the final third. But it isn’t straightforward. Intricate passing and excellent close control is fundamental for ball players trying to break the lines. At any level of football, being able to do this fluently can be difficult.

From the other point of view, the team without the ball is obviously trying to stop players finding pockets of space in their defensive shape. How do they do this? Be as compact as possible.

By closing the spaces between the lines, the defending team is making it far more difficult for the opposition to play through them directly. Teams in a mid or low block fundamentally can not allow too much space between their defensive line and those in front. A side with top-quality playmakers or a dominant no.10 will utilise any unoccupied grass to create chances.

Which teams are experts at getting in between the lines?

Every great possession-based team that has ever played the game needs to be excellent at finding this space. But there are some particularly distinguished examples from recent years.

Before he arrived at Manchester United, finding this space was a key feature of Erik ten Hag’s Ajax team who reached the Champions League semi-finals in 2019. In a narrow 4-2-3-1 system, Ajax’s three attacking midfielders used to rotate at every possible opportunity to try and exploit room in front of their opponents' defences.

Their midfield double-pivot of Frenkie De Jong and Lasse Schone were brilliant at playing difficult, round-the-corner passes to the attackers who were focused, almost solely, on getting as much space as possible in between the lines.

Brighton under Roberto De Zerbi became particularly effective when the Italian took charge in the autumn of 2022. Under his tactical stewardship, the Segulls’ pattern of play involved a build-up from deep that focuses heavily on breaking lines, as De Zerbi would aim to lure as many opposition players into their half, before then (ideally) playing their way out of the press. This involves slow accurate build-up, before quick one-touch passing to play out.

They just want the lines closer to their defence, further up the pitch. That gives them more space to play and run into, between the opposition midfield and defence. Brighton remained quite a rigid side when it came to their attacking build-up – but when they did find that golden space between the lines, their clever movement, directness and pace could hurt any team in the Premier League.

Any of the greatest players of the 21st Century – Xavi, Andrea Pirlo, Steven Gerrard – could all play those tricky passes into those receiving between the lines. Any footballer capable of mastering this craft can build a career around it. Because, ultimately, every team is chasing the space between the lines.

Overload. Not just an underrated banger from the Sugababes in 2000, or an Arthur Hailey novel from 1979.

These days when most of us hear the term overload, we think football. As a tactical component, it is basic, but it is what every coach and manager wants from their team when they are on the attack.

Time for FourFourTwo's experts to explain another football term. Let’s take a look at why everyone is chasing the overload and why it has become so important.

What is an overload?

Boiled down to its raw state, if the team with the ball is outnumbering the team without the ball in one area of the pitch, that is an overload.

Teams that are able to consistently form overloads will generally be able to create a lot of goalscoring opportunities. More players equal more goals, right?

In the clip above, the orange team overloads the left wing with four players to create an goal.

But overloads aren't just formed by attackers. In addition, we can also have a defensive overload. This, as you might guess, is when there is as cluster of defensive players remaining compact and outnumbering the attackers in one area of the pitch.

Although the classic overload tends to be though of as an overlap into the penalty area, they don’t always occur in the final attacking third. For example, one of the simple and most effective overloads in the game for a team playing with a back four, is for the two centre-back to split wide. This allows a no.6 to drop into the backline and receive the ball.

Most teams won’t aggressively press all three players, therefore the team with the ball has created a numerical superiority and can now begin to build up from defence. When you’ve got both the ball and overload, it would take a genuine mistake – i.e. a sloppy pass – to lose possession.

When should you overload? And when should you avoid it?

The pros are obvious with this one. If you can create an overload, you have almost certainly created some uncertainty in the opposition defence. Likewise, if you’ve created a defensive overload, the player on the ball can be rushed into a mistake or panicked into making the wrong decision.

To focus on attacking overloads, they often lead to chances in the final third. You can be Pep Guardiola or Sam Allardyce. Whatever your managerial philosophy, every coach that has ever existed wants chances in the final third.

You can also progress up the pitch quickly, break lines and pull out the opposition defence. So everyone wants overloads. But what should you risk to get them?

If you commit to creating overloads, you need technically excellent midfielders and ball-playing defenders. Let’s go back to the example of a midfielder dropping between the centre-halves.

The midfielder doing this needs to be able to play on the half-turn and also be comfortable receiving the ball in tight spaces. This might sound simple, but doing it at the top level against top-quality opponents capable of performing a high press, it isn’t easy.

There’s a time to chase overloads. Sides will have to shift change shape to create one. That makes you vulnerable to a transition if the overload doesn’t end with a goalscoring opportunity.

Once the ball is turned over, the opposition could look to exploit their own numerical advantage. Always look for movement to create overloads. But don’t risk it by throwing the kitchen sink too early.

What are some common examples of overloads?

A common misconception is you need lots of players to create an overload, but it often simply to be a 2v1 situation that proves the most effective. And this is helped by close partnerships in your team.

Gary Neville and David Beckham were a prime example of this for Manchester United and England. It wasn’t always a case of Neville simply overlapping his best mate. The duo were experts at working closely together on the pitch, knowing when it was the right time to double up on one opposition player and keep the ball moving.

Pep Guardiola has perfected the overload, too: this can be from a false nine dropping into midfield or by an inverted full-back forming a box midfield. There are no.10s, like Bruno Fernandes, who are excellent at drifting laterally to combine with wingers, while it's the job of a box-to-box midfielder, like Declan Rice, to overload defensive and attacking areas, depending on the phase of play and which direction Arsenal are transitioning.

The double-pivot midfield is a staple of English football and the heartbeat of a very 4-4-2.

You never heard the phrase, however, when every team in England played with four midfielders across the pitch. It's something that's crept into football over time with the introduction of the idea of… well, a single pivot.

Here at FourFourTwo, we've got breakdowns on every football term you need to know, with over 30 years of experience in the game. Let's get down to another.

What is a double-pivot midfield?

In its simplest form, a double-pivot is just two midfielders paired together in front of the defence.

So long as these two players are the primary cover over the defence – whether you're playing a 4-4-2, 4-2-3-1, or a 3-4-3 – you're playing a double-pivot.

The clip above shows a 4-2-3-1 with a double-pivot in the centre of midfield.

Traditionally, a two-man midfield means that a manager will ask both players to share defensive duties and the shuttling up and down the pitch. In the early days of the Premier League, classic 4-4-2 formations saw double-pivots formed of no.6s or two no.8s who were all-action midfielders tasked with similar jobs: see Roy Keane and Paul Scholes, or Emmanuel Petit and Patrick Vieira.

But as football has evolved, managers have looked to make one player in the double-pivot more of a deep-lying midfielder/regista type tasked with progressing the ball and the other a ball-winner or box-to-box midfielder.

Naturally, there's crossover with both having to do a degree of the other's roles. But this is the age of specialisation, with a Cesc Fabregas paired with an N'Golo Kante, for example.

The evolution of a double-pivot

When Pep Guardiola revolutionised football in the 2000s, he did so with a 4-3-3 formation and the importance given to the ‘pivote’ – the deepest midfielder of the three, and the position he himself played as a player.

The formation wasn't new, of course, with Guardiola's mentor Johan Cruyff preaching the importance of the position. Cruyff once stated on Dutch television that by moving a traditional no.10 behind the ball – to a no.6 position – a creative player would be more involved in the build-up and able to see the whole game. With Pep revolutionising how many thought of the defensive midfielder years later, Sergio Busquets was used at the base of Barcelona's midfield to start attacks, bypass a press and control the tempo for the whole team.

Over time, football has become far more physical than when Busquets first burst into the Barça team – and a single-pivot has become one of the easiest roles to target, given the space that one player has to cover acres of space in front of their own defence.

While Cruyff moved a player deeper to assert numerical superiority in the centre, modern gegenpressing master Jurgen Klopp perhaps killed the single-pivot in his early Liverpool days against Guardiola, swamping Fernandinho of Manchester City and leaving the Brazilian isolated.

Since then, the double-pivot has returned to almost every big team in Europe, as every modern manager looks to add solidity to their midfield ranks. But while the classic English coach would have used four players in defence and two ahead, the double-pivot has evolved with the likes of Guardiola building play with three defenders in the first line (well, sometimes two and a ball-playing goalkeeper).

The double-pivot is still a vital component of building play, however – as it offers double the passing options for the defenders playing out from the back.

The 3-2 build-up shape has risen in popularity in recent years, as it evenly positions everyone. The first line is spread wide enough so that it's impossible press both wide centre-backs – with each centre-back having a member of the double-pivot ahead of them as a passing option.

Cruyff originally wanted a no.6 in front of his back four so that he could have numerical superiority when facing play. Well, it's clear that Guardiola and those he's influenced believe in the same principles, with the 3-2 shape separating your outfielders into two groups of five.

A double-pivot isn't just good for offering more options on the ball. In defensive transition, having two players sharing the centre of the pitch is better than one.

What are the disadvantages of a double-pivot midfield?

Ever wondered why, ahem, less tactically astute managers actually play the 4-4-2? It's the perfect starter formation because it places your players in pairs: two centre-backs, two strikers, a right-back/right-winger combo, a left-back/left-winger combo… and a double-pivot.

Everything's easier with a mate beside you, after all: these pairs all have each other's back in a simple, flat setup because you're essentially only running up and down. The world moved away from the 4-4-2 in the 2000s, however, because of how flat it was.

Double-pivots were suddenly outnumbered by three-man midfields. Guardiola's 4-3-3 enabled his wingers to stay high and not track back, because there was coverage from the no.8s either side of Busquets. A generic 4-4-2 is easy to mark. And if you do have a midfield general a level above the opposition – as Busquets most certainly was, as he's ranked at no.33 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest players of all time – why would you play two men in a position where one will do?

Having a ‘false double-pivot’ of a no.6 and an inverted full-back comes with its own problems, too. Very few footballers are well-rounded enough to defend 1v1 in the channels as a full-back and step into the centre of the pitch with the ease of a natural midfield controller.

In football, a system is only as effective as the individuals who perform it. Not everyone is suited to a double-pivot – whatever the game-state – but Guardiola's found over the years, it's all about balance. Between attack and defence, build-up and transition… and finding the positionally disciplined players who offer a degree of press resistance and complement each other well enough in the centre.

Ah, the target man. When is football at its most beautiful? For some, it is a gently weighted pass rounding off the ultimate team goal: think Carlos Alberto scoring Brazil’s fourth in the 1970 World Cup final against Italy.

For others, it might be an incredibly precise, perfectly executed volley, à la Zinedine Zidane for Real Madrid against Bayer Leverkusen in the 2002 Champions League. Then there of those of us who get the most joy in this sport from seeing a 6ft 7 striker get on the end of a floating cross, hung up to the back post.

Ideally, the striker, opposition goalkeeper and ball all crash into the net. Time for another of FourFourTwo's experts to deliver a tactical explainer on this football term.

What is a target man?

A target man doesn’t necessarily have to be huge, although it does help. As the name suggests they act as a target for their team.

Their aim is to win high, aerial balls, hold up the play to bring other teammates into the attack and generally unsettle the opposition's defence. It is a simple enough role to understand, but in the modern game, it is not an easy tactic to carry out effectively.

In the clip above, the red team play direct to the target man, who knocks the ball onto his fellow forward to chase.

Forwards in this mould have to be particularly strong, yet still be agile enough to cover a huge amount of turf. This is particularly true if you’re a target forward playing for a team that plays in a low block and aren’t particularly interested in the possession battle.

That means your team will probably spend the majority of the game defending, backs-against-the-wall style. In this scenario, the target forward will have to run the channels and utilise whatever space is available.

The target forward won’t look to make blindside runs, at least on a regular basis. Instead they will spend the majority a large proportion of the game with their back to goal, keeping praying defenders at bay.

Who are the best examples of target men?

A common misconception is that a target man can just be any physically imposing forward. Strictly speaking, that isn’t true. Standing at 6'3 and playing up front isn't enough.

Romelu Lukaku is one example. In the early part of his career at Anderlecht, Chelsea (first time) and West Brom, the Belgian built his game around winning aerial duels between the lines and encouraging a physical contest with the defender.

But Lukaku 2.0, on display during his time at Everton, Manchester United, Chelsea (second time) and Inter Milan, preferred running into the channels and poaching between defenders. He was still clearly a broad, physical forward, but didn’t build his game around that and wasn't a target man in the classic sense.

It’s a similar story for Erling Haaland – although as well all know there is very little the Norwegian can’t do. Better examples in recent years are Olivier Giroud (notably at the 2018 World Cup for France where he was hugely influential despite not scoring), Wout Weghorst, Darwin Nunez, Victor Osimhen and going back a little further, Didier Drogba.

Any budding target forward’s initiation should be to watch Drogba’s performance in both legs of Chelsea’s Champions League semi-final triumph over Barcelona in 2012. Simply put, it was one of the greatest displays by a target man in the modern era. Against a high press and Pep Guardiola's team asserting their superiority, the Ivorian's touch, physicality and intelligent hold-up play almost single-handedly disrupted the Barça backline, giving his team a foot in a very tough fight they eventually won.

Of course, the British Isles have also produced a number of great target men down the years like Alan Shearer, Les Ferdinand, John Toshack and going back further, John Charles. From the women's game, one of the best strikers in the sport's history, American Abby Wambach – ranked at no.16 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest women's players ever – was a powerful target forward.

What are the pros and cons of using a target man?

Aside from the obvious benefits of box dominance, having a target man up front can be a pressure valve for any defending team. With just one long ball, you can transition from defence to attack – and when opponents know that big lad up top could win an aerial duel and help you progress up the pitch, they know they can't pen you in with no escape. This is something that a false nine just doesn't offer.

All teams need an outlet like this in their team, and while some managers like Eddie Howe and Jurgen Klopp would almost sacrifice losing that aerial battle to win the second ball with quick counter-pressing, a physical threat like a target man can help bring team-mates into the game. A focal point like this is a good reference point, too, for any playmaker or no.10 looking to attack.

But it's important to note why the big man up top went out of fashion towards the back end of the 2000s: teams stopped playing two players up top.

The idea was that in a little-and-large partnership, the target man would win balls for his strike partner to run onto. Naturally, this overloads central areas – making it a lot easier for defending teams to remain compact and defend that threat. Given their size and build, it's hard to find target men who offer elite movement in isolation and in the age of the lone no.9, it's hard to find a target man who doesn't need support alongside them.

Basically, if you’re playing with the big man ensure you aren’t one-dimensional. Unless that particular dimension happens to be a bulldozer like Drogba.

When we think of the No.6, we often think centre-halves. Bobby Moore, Franco Baresi, Tony Adams, Sol Campbell all spring to mind.

But throughout the continent and vast majority of football, the No.6 is not a defender. Instead the squad number has become synonymous with a very specific type of midfielder.

So what exactly does a no.6 do in the modern game and how does it relate to its team-mates – specifically, the no.8 and no.10? Let's take a look, as FourFourTwo explains one of the most integral football terms you need to know.

What is a No.6?

In a traditional sense the No.6 is a deep-lying midfielder, who will sit at the base of the midfield unit, regardless of the overall formation. They operate as the holding midfielder, receiving the ball in their own half and aiming to build attacks.

Teams with a three-person midfield can have either one or two no.6s depending on the structure of the team. A 4-3-3 system, for example, can be deployed with a single deeper no.6, with two no.8s taking up advanced positions; a 4-2-3-1, meanwhile could see two no.6s and a no.10.

The clip above highlights a loan no.6 in a 4-3-3.

This is a modern iteration that seems to have crept into footballing vernacular with the rise of Spanish football and the sight of Xavi wearing the digit for Barcelona. The first midfielder to wear the no.6 shirt in the Premier League, shockingly, came 24 years into the competition's history, in the shape of Paul Pogba at Manchester United.

But it was on these shores where the origin of the term comes from. One of the earliest recorded uses of numbers in Europe, came back in August 1928 when Sheffield Wednesday faced Arsenal and Chelsea played Swansea.

All teams used the dominant formation of the day the 2-3-5 and all numbers, in the era of 1-11, were assigned accordingly. The shirt with a six on the back was the player occupying the left half-back role – in modern terms a left-sided defensive midfielder.

What is the function of a no.6 – and are there different kinds?

Since the dawn of the role, a no.6's primary job has been to protect the defence behind, especially in transition. Little has changed in that regard – but in a chess-like era for the sport, the role has evolved, regardless of whether you field a single no.6 or a double-pivot.

There are defensive midfielders – who you might hear referred to as anchors, anchormen, destroyers or ball-winning midfielders. These are the tough-tackling, no-nonsense chaps who break up play, win second balls and organise the midfield: your Nobby Stileses and Claude Makeleles.

Then there are holding midfielders – who may be referred to as registas or deep-lying playmakers – tasked with progressing play from this position.

When your team is looking to dominate, a no.6's role is less about stopping the opposition and more what you can do with a ball at your feet. A player like Andrea Pirlo was used to overload build-up with an elite passer (alongside defenders who weren't quite as technically blessed).

He could bait the opposition's press when he was in his own half and when pressure was being sustained in the final third, he was central enough to dictate play from a position with the whole game ahead of him. A top-level no.6 controls attacks when you're ‘horseshoeing’.

In 2013, however, writer Jonathan Wilson identified another no.6 emerging alongside what he called ‘the destroyer’ and ‘the creator’ (our defensive midfielder and holding midfielder, respectively): ‘the carrier’. Citing the likes of Bastian Schweinsteiger, Wilson noted that some defensive midfielders are specialists at neither tackling nor passing, but progressing the ball from deep via dribbling – though these remain rare, with most deep-lying midfielders simply having ball-carrying as an extra string to their bow on top of ball-winning, such as N'Golo Kante.

Who are the great no.6s?

If we look at the top clubs across Europe today, nearly every one of them has a top quality no.6, often two. Declan Rice might wear his beloved No.41 for Arsenal, but he is arguably the best English no.6 since Michael Carrick.

Casemiro has at Old Trafford, but for the last decade his agility, ball retention and tackling ability made him for a long time probably the best no.6 on the planet. Along with Sergio Busquets who was one of the most important cogs in the Barcelona machine when they were regularly reaching the latter stages of the Champions League. Xavi may have wore the number, but Busquets – ranked at no.33 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest players of all time – was closer to the original role.

Bruno Guimaraes emerged as one of the best no.6's in the Premier League at Newcastle United – but conversely, his game often focuses on dribbling and playing short passes, more associated with the no.8, to move his team forward, rather than long-range passing in the mould of Carrick or Andrea Pirlo. Intriguingly, a tempo controller like Sandro Tonali replaced Bruno at no.6 in 2024/25, for the Brazilian to step further up the pitch.

Going back further, Roy Keane in the second half of his career was perhaps the ultimate no.6 in terms of breaking down the opposition attacks but also retaining possession in a positive manner.

Jorginho, Falcao (the Brazilian one) and Javier Mascherano are all other fine examples, but the list of transformative, truly great, No.6s is almost endless. The common thread with all these players is that they could do very simple things well. Tackle and pass… and occasionally, carry.

Is the No.10 football’s most iconic role? It’s hard to argue otherwise.

It's is more than a shirt number. For some, those that take on this role put the ‘beautiful’ into ‘the beautiful game’. They are a fine artist painting the perfect picture, not just another outfield slogger.

But what actually is a No.10? And are the players defined by this position something of an endangered species? Here's your tactical explainer from FourFourTwo, as we break down another football term.

What is a No.10?

In a tactical sense, the No.10 is the player connecting midfield with attack, trying to operate in the pockets of space that may appear in front of the opposition defence.

Traditionally, the shirt number would be given to the team’s most attacking midfielder. And although squad numbers these days often have very little resemblance to the position a player is deployed, the concept still exists throughout the global game.

The clip above shows the no.10 in a 4-2-3-1 formation.

The simplest way is to think of the player positionally as a hook joining attackers and the rest of the team, when in possession. This is where the Argentine term enganche comes from.

A more old-school English term of referring to the position, is playing, “in the hole”. But regardless of the name, all the players are trying to do the same thing. They are required to create as much as possible, either through dribbling or playing incisive passes through to the forwards.

The no.10 can be seen as a role and a position. A playmaker is usually deployed in the no.10 position, though not exclusively: Trent Alexander-Arnold, for example, is a playmaker but not in the no.10 position – while a defensive player could be used in the no.10 position, in a counter-pressing role marking a no.6.

Who are the great No.10s?

Only one place to start with this: arguably the player who in basically every country, other than Brazil and England, is considered the greatest to ever play the game, Diego Maradona – ranked at no.3 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest players of all time.

Maradona was certainly the purest No.10 of all. Never has a player walked onto a pitch more capable of working between the lines than Diego, if anything he thrived on the pressure he received from opponents. The closer they got to him, the deadlier he became.

He didn’t have any defensive responsibilities and was given the freedom to roam into the positions where he could most hurt the opportunity. For Argentina and Napoli in the mid to late 1980s, giving Maradona a free role was a no-brainer, with his vision and creativity capable of winning any game instantly.

His successor at international level, the almost mythical Lionel Messi has mainly worn the no.10 jersey throughout his illustrious career, but for a large portion of this time he operated in a more advanced forward position.

Kaka, Michel Platini, Dennis Bergkamp, Juan Roman Riquelme and Mesut Ozil are all other perfect examples of great No.10s. They could all score plenty of goals but it wasn’t solely what their career was based around.

For a large portion of his Everton and Manchester United career, Wayne Rooney was closer to a No.10 than an out-and-out centre-forward. Rooney has even said on numerous occasions he didn’t consider himself a ‘natural goalscorer.’

Not bad for a player who scored 253 goals for United and who was also England’s record scorer for four years.

What are the pros and cons of playing with a traditional No.10?

Let’s start with the disadvantages. If you’re a team playing a side who are expected to have the ball more than you, and generally do more with it, playing with an old school No.10 is a risky business.

Any coach having to set up in a compact, disciplined shape, primarily to stop the opposition from playing, can’t afford to carry any passengers. Having a player who isn’t great at working backwards or in defensive transition is a luxury that few can afford at the highest level.

Mesut Ozil was a very old-school No.10, and one of the greatest of his generation. But his influence at Arsenal seemed to wane as his time at the club wore on.

When he first arrived the Gunners would dominate possession against the majority of sides in the Premier League, and play a system built around Ozil. But in his last few seasons a weaker Arsenal team, unable to dominate games and bring out the best in Ozil, saw scrutiny fall on his lack of defensive output.

But the advantage is obvious. If your wider attacking set-up ensures that your No.10 can get on the ball and affect the game, creating chances shouldn’t be a problem – and having a central attacking midfielder who can roam into the half-spaces and create overloads can bring the best out of the entire team. A good enganche will always be able to find the spare man behind an opponent's defence.

That’s why the really great ones can often win a game by themselves.

Gegenpressing pioneer Jurgen Klopp has done a lot for the beautiful game. 

As with all the true greats of football management, he will leave more than just memories of trophies, scintillating football and energetic celebrations. Klopp’s arrival and subsequent transformation of the Liverpool team back in 2015, brought with it the term ‘gegenpressing’ into the English football vernacular. 

But what actually is it, and its sister term, “heavy-metal football”? Here's a football term you'll need, as FourFourTwo delves into the word with a simple tactical explainer.

What exactly is gegenpressing?

When translated, gegenpressing is the German term for counter-pressing. Counter-pressing is when a team loses possession of the ball and immediately attempts to win it back as quickly as possible.

Essentially the ‘gegenpressers’ do the opposite of retreating back into their defensive shape. The aim is to win the ball back as soon as it is lost.

The clip above, the team in gold are passing out from the back when the blue team's right-back wins the ball and plays backwards. Instead of retreating back into their shape, the gold team look to press, force the turnover and score as a result of winning the ball high up the pitch.

A player immediately on the ball after a transition in possession, may not have had the required time to assess his or her best passing option. So in theory this the best time to win the ball back. Teams who have the art perfected will often swarm around the player in possession, like bees round a honeypot.

While some observers seem to regard Klopp’s position as the master of gegenpressing as a slight reinvention of the wheel, this strategy isn't simply just running hard towards the ball.

At any level of association football, a team that relies on gegen – or counter – pressing, has to be seriously organised and seriously fit.

Who uses gegenpressing?

Although counter-pressing will be, at least in Premier League terms, heavily associated with Klopp and long-term rival Pep Guardiola, the former Borussia Dortmund boss – ranked at no.29 in FourFourTwo's list of the greatest managers ever – always credited another German coach with elevating the tactic.

Ralf Rangnick was unable to have any real positive influence during his interim spell at Manchester United back in 2021/22. But long before this he was labelled the ‘godfather of pressing’.

His Hoffenheim team of the late-2000s, were flexible when it came to formation, but perfected the art of counter-pressing ruthlessly. Rangnick was also still able to implement the tactic while setting up in a 4-4-2 system, and a time when the formation had fallen out of fashion across Europe.

Rangnick is credited with influencing Klopp after Hoffenheim thrashed his Dortmund side 4-1 early on, way back in the 2008/09 season. It is a similar story for the likes of Thomas Tuchel, Julian Nagelsmann and Ralph Hasenhuttl. For these coaches, gegenpressing forms the cornerstone of their wider tactical approach.

The roots of the press lie with the Dutch philosophy of Rinus Michels, meanwhile, with Guardiola a famous modern advocate that an opposition team were most vulnerable within six seconds of receiving the ball.

Within that timeframe, the team were not in their optimum shape and were ripe for stealing the ball from: hence in the introduction of counter-pressing quickly to win possession before the other team had time to regroup.

It's important to note that counter-pressing is a slightly different idea to the high press. While the likes of Klopp favoured a high press to establish their authority in the opponent's third, it's possible to be a manager who wants quick pressing triggers – just not as high up the pitch. Unai Emery is one manager who has on occasion favoured a quick counter-press in the centre of the pitch over asking his forwards to push onto their opposition centre-backs.

What are the disadvantages of gegenpressing?

There are a few cons with counter-pressing. The obvious issue is that the more players are drawn to the ball, the more space you are leaving in behind. This is why when coming up against quality no.6s, capable of hitting accurate first-time passes, a team rigidly gegenpressing, can be easily exposed.

Ball-playing centre-backs and goalkeepers have improved in the last decade – and while a high press was thought as the best way to approach any game when Pep Guardiola first revolutionised the sport, a lot of managers these days prefer not to counter-press teams like Arsenal under Mikel Arteta, Brighton under Roberto De Zerbi and Newcastle under Eddie Howe, passing the burden of controlling the game over. If you are confident that your compact shape will result in the opposition ‘horseshoeing’ the ball and failing to cut you open, you can probably cause more damage in transition than you can with a counter-press.

Also, the intensity required for this tactic means it is difficult to employ at the highest level, week after week over a gruelling season. This is perhaps why managers who utilise the tactic, also often favour rotation. For example when Klopp’s Liverpool won the Champions League in 2018/19, what many observers considered to be their strongest XI, only started one game which just happened to be the Champions League final against Tottenham.

The rise in popularity of the inverted full-back in England has grown hugely. Remember in 2015 when Jamie Carragher gleefully told us on Monday Night Football that "no one wants to be a full-back as a kid, no one wants to grow up and be a Gary Neville"?

Well that was back when full-backs weren't cool. But these days, mainly down to the rise of the inverted full-back, it is very cool to be a Gary Neville or err... (maybe more accurately) a Trent Alexander-Arnold.

But what is inversion when it comes to full-backs? Well, FourFourTwo are here to explain this vital football term – let's get stuck in.

What is an inverted full-back?

To debunk a common myth, inverted full-backs aren’t simply full-backs playing on their unnatural side, e.g a left-footed defender deployed at right-back, or vice-versa.

Instead an inverted full-back is a full-back who moves inside into central spaces when their team has possession, well advanced of the centre-backs. In most modern systems they will flank a defensive midfielder, pushing forward towards, or even beyond, the halfway line to receive the ball and play forward.

In the clip above, the left-back inverts into midfield – with the team's 4-3-3 shape resembling something more like a 3-2-2-3.

Once possession is lost, usually the inverted full-back will look to recover to a more traditional wide defensive area as quickly as possible.

The basic aim is to help offer teams numerical superiority in the middle of the pitch, particularly when having the majority of possession against teams sitting in a deeper low block, with a more defensive mindset. In turn, this allows the team's midfielders to push higher and receive the ball in dangerous areas.

On a simple level, inverted full-backs are useful to teams looking to control – with a box midfield usually formed from an inverted full-back, a no.6 and to no.8s higher up.

Why use inverted full-backs?

Upon moving to the transition-heavy Bundesliga, Pep Guardiola wanted his Bayern Munich team to sustain pressure in the final third without the fear of being countered.

The Catalan boss moved away from a regista-like midfielder to encourage his centre-backs and goalkeeper to have more emphasis in buildup, in the face of a high press. With Philipp Lahm and David Alaba technically blessed full-backs, the pair of them tucked into midfield to not just assist in buildup – but to pack out midfield in a 2-3-5 shape in case of a counter-attack.

This shape gave Bayern three excellent ball players who were natural defenders in the second line of their buildup, supplying what was essentially a front five: like having three no.6s able to dictate play and suffocate the opposition. Opposing managers were then left with the conundrum: how do cope with the central overload, without leaving Arjen Robben and Franck Ribery isolated with your own full-backs?

 Who uses inverted full-backs? 

The short answer is that quite a lot of managers have at least used a variation of the system.

Guardiola is widely credited with bringing inverted full-backs back into modern-day tactics, however, like with most tactical innovations, Johan Cruyff had already used them years before at Barcelona. At times, Pep has inverted both of his full-backs, but occasionally during his Manchester City tenure, the Catalan has deployed just one rather than two, with the other full-back sitting in a more traditional spot alongside the centre-halves.

It is also worth noting that although City adopted the system in Guardiola’s very first Premier League fixture, a narrow 2-1 win against Sunderland, they struggled to create chances. Possibly because the two full-backs in question, Gael Clichy and Bacary Sagna, were not at the peak of their powers and struggled to cope with the role’s challenging physical demands.

Former Athletic and Leeds boss Marcelo Bielsa also utilised a version of the system, when taking Chile to the last 16 of the 2010 World Cup, while Roberto De Zerbi and Ange Postecoglou were already fans of the tactic before leaving a mark on the Premier League. Meanwhile, Mikel Arteta’s adoption of the system at Arsenal, is interesting in that it is perhaps more of a defensive ploy than an attacking one.

The Spaniard placed a real emphasis on Ben White and Oleksandr Zinchenko sitting narrowly inside, to create a more structured shape when his team have the ball. Even when Arsenal lose the ball one of the pair tends to stay narrow, to ensure the opposition doesn’t have an easy counter-attacking opportunity, with no one protecting the last line of defence.

Trent Alexander-Arnold's gradual move infield is also a result of Jurgen Klopp utilising the tactic at Liverpool. When the academy graduate first broke into the team he would normally stay wide, in an attempt to try and overlap the inside forwards. In Klopp's final Anfield season, he would pick up possession close to the centre circle, sometimes between the centre-backs.

What are the disadvantages of using inverted full-backs? 

Plenty of teams have found that inverted full-backs provide a numerical advantage in build-up – but what about further forward? Without overlapping full-backs, touchline wingers can become isolated.

And before your Sunday League team attempts to tactically embed a revolutionary 2-3-5 in-possession system, complete with inverted full-backs, you may want to stop and think. Are those selected in the roles truly excellent footballers? If your full-back is a no-nonsense defender whose primary concern is stopping the opposition wingers, having him or her on the halfway line trying to link play probably isn’t the way to go.

Inverted full-backs also have to be agile enough to quickly return to their wide defensive position when the opposing team attacks. This is actually an incredibly underrated skill. After all, not many of us have Kyle Walker’s recovery speed and without that level of athleticism, it isn’t easy to stay defensively solid. If either full-back is unable to still effectively defend their flank, a team employing this tactic could quickly become overrun down the channels.

When it's played well though, this tactic can be used to devastating effect. It also shows that defenders can be composed and technically excellent on the ball. Maybe the next generation will want to be Gary Nevilles after all?

Transitions, eh? Well, we’re constantly told how football matches are defined by fine margins. The ball hits the post and goes one way, you’re a winner, the other way, a loser.

But these minor differences aren’t just limited to penalty kicks, or the sitter your centre-back scuffed at the back post in the 89th minute. More often than you might realise, one point can become three thanks to a well-worked transition. It’s not an exact science, but plenty of matches at every level of the game are decided on transitions and which team can execute them most effectively. 

But why are they so important to coaches and how do teams that become masters in transitions, from the Champions League to Sunday League, win so often? Time for FourFourTwo's experts to explain, with another lesson on a football term for your lexicon.

What are transitions? 

Transitions in football are relatively simple. On a basic level, the term refers to a change in possession, from one team to another.

Naturally an attacking transition involves a team regaining the ball and progressing forward with it. A defensive transition, meanwhile, refers to a team losing the ball and how they react to regain it.

In the clip above, the yellow team advance quickly in an attacking transition – before losing the ball and backtracking in a defensive transition.

These moments may only be fleeting, but they are absolutely crucial to the flow of a game. Teams who are excellent in transition will be able to react fast and regain their shape quickly, whether they have the ball or not. 

Completing an attacking transition at speed – otherwise known as a counter-attack – is vital when looking to exploit teams who struggle to get back into their defensive block. It is at this precise moment the opposition is at its most vulnerable, with open spaces between the lines that attackers can exploit. 

The speed of this reaction is often what separates players from the very top of the game, to a steady career in the lower tiers.  

Who effectively uses attacking transitions?

In some quarters, Jose Mourinho is often unfairly labelled as yesterday’s football manager. A serial winner but, to some, no longer a truly elite coach. 

Yet it is easy to forget how Mourinho’s principles around attacking transitions have helped define the tactical evolution of the elite game for the last 20 years, ever since taking Porto to that sensational Champions League triumph in 2004.

Jose’s sides at Porto, Chelsea and Inter Milan during the 2000s had an emphasis on staying defensively compact and then recovering in their attacking shape quickly. Even today, it remains fundamental to the way the Portuguese coach sets up a team.

Advancing up the pitch as quickly as possible – usually without resorting to aimless long balls to a target man – is the aim. It is a difficult balance to strike. But when the 'Special One' perfects his approach, his teams can be very difficult to stop on the counter. 

Diego Simeone at Atletico Madrid is another prime example of the success coaches can have when prioritising the attacking transition. The Argentine’s team are able to overload the central areas of the pitch, yet still produce lighting quick attacking transitions, normally led by two mobile centre forwards. Having two strikers in the mould of Antoine Griezmann, Luis Suarez, Diego Costa or even Joao – who are effective at drifting out wide to exploit the channels – allows Atleti to sit narrow and deep without the ball, but still carry a huge threat on the break.

More and more in the modern game, teams are forgoing a horseshoe in their opponent's third – and instead look to bait a press with their own build-up, before breaking quickly up the other end of the pitch. Ruben Amorim's Sporting were masters of breaking like this, often playing box-to-box, retreating back to their own goalkeeper if they couldn't find an opening in the final third.

Who effectively uses defensive transitions?

Quite possibly, every great team in football history? You can go through all of the true masters with the ball in European club history – Ajax 1970-73, Milan 1987-91, Barcelona 2009-12 – and what is often forgotten is that they were just as good when they lost the ball, as when they had it.

If you can perfect the defensive transition – either through an aggressive high press or just regrouping well into a settled shape – you can significantly reduce your opponent's chances of playing through your defensive structure. Essentially, even the best teams will still concede goals, but if the only way to score against you is through a set play or a moment of individual brilliance, you’ll win more games than you lose throughout a long season. 

Retreating teams will emphasise getting goal side and asserting numerical superiority behind the ball as quickly as possible. From there they can create a solid defensive structure that is harder for the opposition to play through. Thomas Tuchel, Rafael Benitez and Roy Hodgson are all masters of getting their teams to contain their rivals in this manner.

Alternatively, counter-pressing focuses on putting immediate pressure on the ball regardless of where on the pitch possession has been lost. Players will try and recover the ball, ideally in a dangerous area. Naturally, this requires a huge amount of energy and effort from every player to be deployed effectively.  

Arrigo Sacchi’s dominant Milan were perhaps the ultimate masters. Whenever they lost possession, Sacchi expected his team to win the ball back high up the pitch, denying their opponents the time and space to regroup. 

In the current game, Jurgen Klopp, Mauricio Pochettino and Marcelo Bisela’s tactical approach is defined by focusing on a counter-press in transition, while also forming a crucial pillar of Barcelona’s set-up even a decade after Pep Guardiola left the club. 

Chelsea manager Mauricio Pochettino had his sights set well beyond February when discussing his newly-booked place in the League Cup final on Tuesday night. 

The Blues boss trumped Middlesbrough 6-1 to secure a Wembley outing scheduled for February 25th. Like a deft politician he grabbed the chance to engage in a bit of reputation management in the process, projecting a fantasy in a bid to lower expectations from his chairman and supporters. 

“It’s an amazing achievement because I think it was the objective when we started,” he said, cutting a theatrical figure in front of the press. “With no Europe, no Champions League, Europa League or Conference League, to build a team nearly from zero, that was the objective: to be at Wembley in February. I think the job is done.”

It’s a stretch.

To start, ‘building a team from nearly zero.’ Ten of Pochettino’s 16 used players on Tuesday were established at Chelsea before his arrival; two were already in the academy. Just four – Đorđe Petrović, Axel Disasi, Moises Caicedo and Cole Palmer – were his signings. Some building job.

Since 2004/05 Chelsea have reached the League or FA Cup final 13 times, more often than every other season. For a club that’s spent the most in the league over the last two seasons by more than double, doing so again doesn’t count for success.

To labour the point, Pochettino suggests not competing in Europe makes a League Cup run even more impressive. Anyone in their right mind would suggest it’s the reverse: one of the league’s most expensive squads has fewer games than their rivals and should demand progression in the remaining competitions. Every team above Chelsea bar Spurs is performing better with a denser schedule.

But Pochettino will have known the fiction behind his comments. He even acknowledged their dubious nature when he said: “On the other side it looks like it’s not important because Chelsea is about winning the Champions League and Premier League.”

Clearly, though, capitalising on a glowing performance was irresistible: Chelsea’s Wembley ticket buys him a month-long shield, and with six goals in the bank he can ride high on a fanbase hoarse from bastardising Liquidator on Tuesday night.

As one of the world’s top managers Pochettino has led Chelsea to ninth in the league and the universal agreement that they’ve underachieved so far. Overcoming Fulham or a Liverpool side with other priorities to lift the League Cup might salvage a poor campaign; reaching the final in itself will not.

But the court of public opinion is fluid, and sowing the seeds of a warped viewpoint prepares the defence against further disappointment. Fail to reach Europe? We made Wembley. Under-perform with a talented and costly squad? We had to build it from scratch. Miss the chance to benefit from a light fixture schedule? It was a long League Cup campaign.

Pochettino is experienced at operating under challenging regimes. He has a reputation – and a job – to protect, and a tricky boss to placate. Should Boehly sign a premature P45 this season, its recipient can hope to be defended by those who bought his latest comments. If the objective when he joined was to reach Wembley, how can he be sacked?

It's a sign of Chelsea’s recent fall from grace and clouds an otherwise celebratory achievement. Pochettino will hope it doesn’t prove necessary come May: this flimsy argument won’t stand up if it does.

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