The way Johan Manzambi and Nicolas Jackson juggled the ball between each other ahead of the latter’s goal was the high point on an insistent theme, reminiscent of school friends playing at lunchtime, always looking for each other in that nonchalant (ok, smug) way that kids sometimes do.
Poetically for Villa, it was two new signings flourishing precisely because two new Tottenham signings were failing.
More damning still, the Manzambi-Jackson connection resulted from an Unai Emery tactical battle-plan that had targeted Tottenham’s midfield from the outset; the epicentre of Tottenham’s £300 million summer splurge was the very place Emery had identified as their weakness, their soft target.
Villa’s setup was unorthodox for Emery, who did not pick a speedy winger on one side (usually a non-negotiable) and instead had Emiliano Buendia and John McGinn invert from the wings with Manzambi – nominally the ten – dropping deep in what almost looked like a free role.
It caused problems for Tottenham throughout the match, most notably when Manzambi ghosted into the box to score the opener, although the tactic really came off in the second half, when Villa were able to walk through the middle again and again:
But the best example of this phenomenon was Buendia’s winning goal, which ended a nine-pass, 31-second Villa move defined by cutting open Spurs’ midfield no less than three times, the third being Buendia’s finish in open space:
