The way Johan Manzambi and Nicolas Jackson juggled the ball between each other ahead of the latter’s goal was the high point on an insistent theme, reminiscent of school friends playing at lunchtime, always looking for each other in that nonchalant (ok, smug) way that kids sometimes do.
Poetically for Villa, it was two new signings flourishing precisely because two new Tottenham signings were failing.
More damning still, the Manzambi-Jackson connection resulted from an Unai Emery tactical battle-plan that had targeted Tottenham’s midfield from the outset; the epicentre of Tottenham’s £300 million summer splurge was the very place Emery had identified as their weakness, their soft target.
Villa’s setup was unorthodox for Emery, who did not pick a speedy winger on one side (usually a non-negotiable) and instead had Emiliano Buendia and John McGinn invert from the wings with Manzambi – nominally the ten – dropping deep in what almost looked like a free role.
It caused problems for Tottenham throughout the match, most notably when Manzambi ghosted into the box to score the opener, although the tactic really came off in the second half, when Villa were able to walk through the middle again and again:
But the best example of this phenomenon was Buendia’s winning goal, which ended a nine-pass, 31-second Villa move defined by cutting open Spurs’ midfield no less than three times, the third being Buendia’s finish in open space:
What’s damning about all of this isn’t that De Zerbi’s midfield press was broken, nor that his £175 million midfielders were completely disconnected, allowing Villa to breeze through. It’s that Emery knew this would happen - and devised a tactical plan to exploit it.
Perhaps De Zerbi and Spurs just need time on the training ground to fine-tune the details of the manic man-to-man pressing system that unravelled on Saturday. The thing is, time and patience are already running out.
Henderson-Barco pivot tells us Alonso failed to prepare for Brentford
The paradox of Brentford’s 3-0 victory over Chelsea was that we learnt nothing new - which taught us a lot about Xabi Alonso.
Brentford were Brentford: ruthlessly organised, the physical strength and tactical diligence of their man-to-man pressing wrestling Chelsea into patterns they didn’t want to form. They broke up play, they made it scrappy, and then they capitalised in key moments: set-pieces (goals one and three) and counter-attacks (goal two).
It was textbook, and although sometimes Brentford at their absolute best are simply unstoppable, particularly at home, it does beg the question: had Alonso done his homework?
Put bluntly, this was not the time to trial a brand new midfield partnership featuring two players making their full Premier League debuts, one a youngster new to the country and one a veteran who never had the agility or dexterity to play through Brentford-style pressure.
As I highlighted a fortnight ago, Alonso’s two-man midfield contains tactical flaws that might just be unsolvable. They definitely won’t be solved by a Jordan Henderson and Valentin Barco pivot, not against Brentford’s midfield.
Here’s a typical example of where it went wrong. Brentford hold their ground, forcing Lacroix to keep the ball for 13 seconds before attempting an ambitious long ball out to the left. He has no options because Brentford’s man-to-man press prevents it; because neither Barco nor Henderson can be trusted to get on the ball, resist pressure, and break the lines.
Brentford’s second goal, scored on the break, resulted from the same issue. Henderson gets on the ball here and, with nothing in the pocket to play, fires an ambitious pass that gets intercepted, leading to the goal.
Malo Gusto and Romeo Lavia, both on the bench, would have been far better suited to the challenge, although more importantly Alonso should have adapted his 3-4-2-1 formation.
Already that 3-4-2-1 is too easy to read, too easy for someone like Keith Andrews to prepare for. Chelsea needed Morgan Rogers or Cole Palmer to drop short and wide, or one of the wing-backs to come infield to create an overload, or… anything, really, that would have been unexpected; that might have bamboozled Brentford or at least pulled a man-to-man marker out of position.
Chelsea attempted 28 crosses in this match, each one predictably swatted away. They got done by Brentford like Brentford used to do teams in their first season in the Premier League, which is to say Alonso just didn’t look adequately prepared.
If Chelsea are to challenge for honours, he needs to adapt much faster than this.
-
1
